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A. INTRODUCTION 
Blockchain technology,1 fintech,2 and cryptoassets (also called “digital 
assets”)3 have become universal economic phenomena.  Capital markets have 
witnessed sales of digital assets in the form of digital securities, tokens, and 
coins distributed by private entities and even by the World Bank.4  The 
importance of cryptoassets and blockchain technology is hard to 
 
 1. A blockchain is “a cryptographically-secured digital ledger, and a blockchain’s protocol is 
the software that governs rules, operations, and communications between computers interacting 
with the blockchain.”  Simply Vital Health, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 10671, at 2 (Aug. 12, 
2019), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2019/33-10671.pdf.  A “distributed ledger” (which is 
the underlying feature of “distributed ledger technology” or “DLT”) can be described as “a large, 
decentralized database that is maintained on a network of computers rather than a single server, and 
that is updated in real-time.”  Hilary J. Allen, $=€=Bitcoin?, 76 MD. L. REV. 877, 886 (2017).  See 
also Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384, 390–91 (2017) [hereinafter 
Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw]; Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market 
Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 843–
44 (2015).  
 2. “Fintech” refers to the integration of financial services and technology.  See, e.g., Chris 
Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235, 241 n.18 
(2019) (defining the “broad definition of fintech” as “the use of digital technologies in finance”); 
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY: INFORMATION ON 
SUBSECTORS AND REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 1 (2017), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684187.pdf (noting that “[f]intech products and services include 
small business financing, education refinancing, mobile wallets, virtual currencies, and platforms 
to connect investors and start-ups”). 
 3. The term “refers to an asset that is issued and transferred using distributed ledger or 
blockchain technology, including, but not limited to, so-called ‘virtual currencies,’ ‘coins,’ and 
‘tokens.’” SEC, FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT CONTRACT” ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ASSETS (last 
modified Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/dlt-framework.pdf [hereinafter THE SEC 
FRAMEWORK].  Cryptoassets are “an entry in a ledger that specifies that a particular user 
[can] . . . exercise a discrete set of powers.”  Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & 
David Wishnick, Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 602 (2019).  
 4. See infra Section B; Steven Gatti, David Adams, Peter Chapman, Laura Nixon, Paul 
Landless, Jack Hardman & Brian Harley, Fintech in 2019, Five Trends to Watch, NYU: PROGRAM 
ON CORP. COMPLIANCE & ENF’T (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2019/02/07/fintech-in-2019-five-trends-to-watch/. 
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overestimate.5  These innovations have been closely watched by foreign6 and 
U.S. regulators.7  2019 and the first three quarters of 2020 produced as many 
as five bills in Congress and one major proposal—Rule 195—by an SEC 
Commissioner who is a leading expert on technology and digital assets.8  In 
turn, legal scholarship has examined how to fit blockchain-based entities and 
digital assets within the corporate and securities law frameworks.9   
 
 5. Among other things, blockchain technology can reduce compliance and contracting costs 
and improve transaction verification mechanisms, record keeping, shareholder voting, contract 
performance, and title transfers, although it also poses a series of risks.  See, e.g., Carla L. Reyes, If 
Rockefeller Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 373, 379–88 (2019) [hereinafter Reyes, 
Rockefeller]; Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157, 158–161 (2020); 
David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 REV. OF FIN. 7, 7–8 (2017); Joshua 
A.T. Fairfield, Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 808–09 (2015); Federico Panisi, Ross P. 
Buckley & Douglas W. Arner, Blockchain and Public Companies: A Revolution in Share 
Ownership Transparency, Proxy Voting and Corporate Governance?, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. 
& POL’Y 1, 2-4 (2019); Brummer & Yadav, supra note 2, at 272; Letter from Trey Hollingsworth, 
Darren Soto, Bill Foster, Tom Emmer, Ted Budd, Josh Gottheimer & David Schweikert, Members, 
U.S. House of Representatives, to Lawrence Kudlow, Dir., Nat’l Econ. Council (May 24, 2019), 
https://hollingsworth.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hollingsworth_soto_blockchain_letter.pdf. 
 6. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIGITAL AND DIGITIZED ASSETS: FEDERAL AND 
STATE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES 39–200, 227–29, 236–80 (2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/business_law/buslaw/committees/C
L620000pub/digital_assets.pdf [hereinafter ABA, DIGITAL ASSETS]; Brief for Chamber of Digital 
Commerce as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff, SEC v. Telegram Inc. & Ton Issuer Inc., No. 1:19-
cv-09439-PKC, 2020 WL 61528, at *5 n.10 (Jan. 21, 2020) [hereinafter Chamber’s Brief]. 
 7. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRYPTOCURRENCY ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORK 
(2020), https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1326061/download; FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, 
ADDRESSING THE REGULATORY, SUPERVISORY AND OVERSIGHT CHALLENGES RAISED BY 
“GLOBAL STABLECOIN” ARRANGEMENTS: CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT (2020), 
https://www.fsb.org/2020/04/addressing-the-regulatory-supervisory-and-oversight-challenges-
raised-by-global-stablecoin-arrangements-consultative-document/.  See generally Yuliya Guseva, 
The SEC, Digital Assets, and Game Theory, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Guseva, 
Game Theory]. 
 8. Securities Clarity Act, H.R. 8378, 116th Cong. (2020), 
https://emmer.house.gov/_cache/files/d/e/de97d89a-a652-42e9-a436-
b36fd541933f/E5FEB0CE89638FF4E5C649E1AC916FC5.emmer-041-xml.pdf; Keep Big Tech 
Out of Finance Act, H.R. 4813, 116th Cong. (2019); Token Taxonomy Act of 2019, H.R. 2144, 
116th Cong. (2019); Crypto-Currency Act of 2020, H.R. 6154, 116th Cong. (2020); Managed 
Stablecoins are Securities Act of 2019, H.R. 5197, 116th Cong. (2019); Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, 
SEC, Running on Empty: A Proposal to Fill the Gap Between Regulation and Decentralization (Feb. 
6, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-blockress-2020-02-06 [hereinafter 
Peirce Speech and Proposal] (proposing Rule 195).  
 9. The following is by no means an exhaustive list of scholarly publications on these issues.  
See, e.g., Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, supra note 1; Usha R. Rodrigues, Law and the 
Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 679 (2019) (discussing the incomplete nature of new smart contracts 
and applying it to business organizations law); Eric C. Chaffee, Securities Regulation in Virtual 
Space, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1387 (2017); Brummer & Yadav, supra note 2; Lewis Rinaudo 
Cohen, Ain’t Misbehavin’: An Examination of Broadway Tickets and Blockchain Tokens, 65 
WAYNE L. REV. 81 (2019); Panisi et al., supra note 5; William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 
VAND. L. REV. 1167 (2018) (reviewing fintech challenges from the perspective of financial 
regulation and Dodd-Frank in particular); Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Crypto Securities: On the Risks 
of Investments in Blockchain-Based Assets and the Dilemmas of Securities Regulation, 68 AM. U. 
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This Article contributes to the growing literature on crypto and fintech 
and discusses two distinct stages in cryptoasset capital raising.  Securities law 
is crucial in the first stage but essentially irrelevant in the second stage.  
Academic commentary has either missed or misinterpreted when this second 
stage begins and what the rights and obligations of the affected parties are.  
Most importantly, two recent judicial decisions—Telegram10 and Kik11—
suggest that federal district courts struggle with distinguishing and 
conceptualizing the discrete stages in the development of crypto projects.  
The first stage (“Stage One”) is mainly about raising capital: Firms 
acting as issuers offer and sell securities to investors, often on the promise to 
deliver a functioning and marketable product, i.e., digital assets, as a form of 
return.12  With the exception of the financial instruments issued by 
decentralized autonomous organizations (“DAOs”) and certain governance 
tokens,13 many digital assets do not confer voting rights or other equity-like 
rights with respect to issuers, nor do they trigger fiduciary duties typically 
associated with equity.14  
 
L. REV. 69 (2018); Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings: The Top 25 Jurisdictions and Their 
Comparative Regulatory Responses (as of May 2018), 1 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 41 
(2018); Kevin Werbach, Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law, 33 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 487 (2018); Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and 
the Rise of Lex Cryptographia 1 (Mar. 20, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664 (presenting one of the first accounts 
on decentralized autonomous organizations and smart contracts); Kelsey Bolin, Decentralized 
Public Ledger Systems and Securities Law: New Applications of Blockchain Technology and the 
Revitalization of Sections 11 and 12(A)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 955, 
955 (2018) (reviewing the federal and state law); Dmitri Boreiko, Guido Ferrarini & Paolo Giudici., 
Blockchain Startups and Prospectus Regulation, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 665 (2019); J. Brad 
Bernthal, The Evolution of Entrepreneurial Finance: A New Typology, 2018 BYU L. REV. 773, 
773–74 (2018) (discussing emerging forms of startup financing and the decreasing role of corporate 
law and proposing a new typology of financial instruments that are outside the debt-equity divide); 
Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the 
Democratization of Public Capital Markets, 70 HASTING L.J. 463, 470–85 (2019); Carol Goforth, 
Securities Treatment of Tokenized Offerings Under U.S. Law, 46 PEPP. L. REV. 405, 416–17 (2019) 
[hereinafter Goforth, Securities Treatment of Tokenized Offerings]; Carol R. Goforth, How 
Blockchain Could Increase the Need for and Availability of Contractual Ordering for Companies 
and Their Investors, 94 N.D. L. REV. 1, 1 (2019) [hereinafter Goforth, Contractual Ordering]. 
 10. SEC v. Telegram Group, Inc., No. 19-cv-9439 (PKC), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53846 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2020) [hereinafter Court Order]. 
 11. SEC v. Kik Interactive, No. 19 Civ. 5244 (AKH), 2020 WL 5819770, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
2020). 
 12. See infra Sections B & C. 
 13. An example of governance tokens is the tokens recently issued by decentralized finance 
protocol Uniswap.  Paddy Baker, Uniswap’s Newly Launched UNI Token Has Already Doubled in 
Price, COINDESK (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/uniswap-uni-token-price. For a 
discussion of DAOs, see infra Section E. 
 14. See infra Section E (discussing DAOs); Section B.1 (examining token classifications); see 
also infra note 285 and accompanying text.  Some scholars discuss various financial tokens under 
a broad heading of “equity tokens.”  See, e.g., Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. Arner 
  
170 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:166 
If we narrow down the capital structure of all firms and projects to only 
two general categories of debt and equity, many digital assets in Stage One 
will default to debt securities such as bonds or unsecured debentures.15  Both 
are commonly combined under the umbrella term of “bonds”—diverse and 
variegated debt securities that are creatures of contract16 and a subclass of 
financial instruments.17  Viewed in this light, offering documents—including 
whitepapers and, in some cases, purchase agreements for future tokens along 
the lines of the “SAFT” framework18—may be examined as de facto bond 
indentures, prospectuses, and offering memoranda.  
As developed further in this Article, the key parties in Stage One are the 
initial purchasers (the “Initial Investors” or “Initial Token-Holders”) of future 
tokens and the developer (or “issuer-developer”)19 with its intra-firm 
governance mechanisms.  It is logical that the Initial Token-Holders 
providing debt financing are investors giving (1) their capital (2) to a 
 
& Linus Föhr, The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam, It’s a Bubble, It’s a Super Challenge for Regulators, 
60 HARV. INT’L L.J. 267, 275 (2019) (“Currency tokens are characterized by a token reflecting a 
right in another currency, whether crypto or otherwise.  Equity tokens represent the right to a share 
in a cash flow generated by some underlying asset.  Among the equity tokens, some ICOs confer 
participation of token holders in an asset pool in a non-segregated manner, while in other cases the 
token allows participation in one single asset, separable from other assets.”).  This Article examines 
only decentralized autonomous organizations’ tokens as equity-like financial instruments.  These 
tokens give token-holders the rights to, inter alia, vote and receive income directly tied to the 
operations of a DAO.  
 15. ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS SOLUTIONS § 155:79 (2020) 
(“Debentures are generally ‘unsecured’ and the indebtedness of the corporation evidenced by a 
debenture is backed solely by the overall financial condition and creditworthiness of the 
corporation.”). 
 16. RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 351–53 (10th ed. 2011).  
 17. MERRITT B. FOX, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN & GABRIEL V. RAUTERBERG, THE NEW STOCK 
MARKET: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY 11 (2019) (“A financial instrument . . . is essentially a 
contract that provides the contract holder with some kind of claim to the cash flows and/or control 
of a business.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Thomas Bourveau, Emmanuel T. De George, Atif Ellahie & Daniele Macciocchi, 
Initial Coin Offerings: Early Evidence on the Role of Disclosure in the Unregulated Crypto Market 
3 (July 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.marshall.usc.edu/sites/default/files/2019-
03/thomas_bourveau_icos.pdf (explaining that a whitepaper is “an unaudited marketing document 
that might contain information such as the business proposition for the crypto-token, addressable 
market opportunity, technology, proof-of-concept case studies, expected progress timeline, identity 
and background of the team, ICO process and platform, token distribution, vesting restrictions, use 
of proceeds, etc.”); JUAN BATIZ-BENET, MARCO SANTORI & JESSE CLAYBURGH , THE SAFT 
PROJECT: TOWARD A COMPLIANT TOKEN SALE FRAMEWORK (2017), 
https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-Project-Whitepaper.pdf. 
 19. I use the terms “developer,” “issuer-developer” and “firm-developer” interchangeably and 
primarily to describe promoters of crypto-projects.  After an open-source project’s launch, however, 
these original firm-developers may join the community of other developers, i.e., third-party 
developers.  For a review of relevant parties in open-source decentralized projects, see Carla L. 
Reyes, (Un)Corporate Crypto-Governance, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1875, 1886–88 (2020) 
[hereinafter Reyes, (Un)Corporate Crypto-Governance]. 
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common enterprise (3) with the expectation to earn profit (4) from the efforts 
of the developer.  These four characteristics are the backbone of the Supreme 
Court’s Howey test, which is typically applied by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to digital assets that are deemed “investment 
contracts” and, therefore, securities.20  This Article will examine digital assets 
as new types of bonds, apply the Howey test to these instruments, and show 
why and how securities law is crucial in Stage One but not in Stage Two of 
cryptoasset projects.  
The second stage (“Stage Two”) begins with the launch of a 
decentralized platform, DAO, or decentralized application (“Dapp”) and the 
delivery of fully functional digital assets.  At this point, the status of token-
holders and the nature of the assets, as well as the need for and applicability 
of securities law, become less clear.  The facts in Telegram underscore these 
dilemmas and the discreteness of the two-stage process.  
Had Telegram been allowed to distribute its tokens and launch the new 
blockchain, anyone would be able to build on the platform (viz., it was open 
source), the code underlying the assets could not be unilaterally changed by 
the original promoter-developer (i.e., Telegram), and the promoter would not 
have the means to singlehandedly impact the platform and the assets, 
including their supply, demand, and valuation.21  These factors infer that 
project governance would effectively metamorphose into a decentralized and 
autonomous system.  This point of metamorphosis (provided it is 
discernable)22 should work as the cutoff point where conventional securities 
law becomes largely irrelevant as crypto-market mechanisms take over.  
At the same time, as this Article will demonstrate, this cutoff point does 
not either alter the rights of the Initial Investors or destroy the original 
“indenture.”23  The root cause is that neither token delivery nor platform 
launch is determinative of the expiration or maturity of the original bonds.  
Determining the bonds’ term to maturity becomes key to understanding the 
nature of the transactions, the Initial Investors’ rights, and the firm-
developer’s obligations.24   
The term to maturity does three things.  First, bonds are securities.  Their 
continuous existence in both Stages One and Two, i.e., even after fully-
 
 20. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).  For the most recent application of the test, 
see SEC v. Kik Interactive, No. 19 Civ. 5244 (AKH), 2020 WL 5819770, at *5–8 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).  
 21. See infra Sections B & C. 
 22. In Kik, for instance, Stages One and Two were obscure because the developer conducted 
both a private placement of bonds and a public distribution of the digital assets (called “Kin”) 
approximately at the same time and, as the district court concluded, for the same purposes of 
developing the Kin Ecosystem leading to an integration of the offerings.  Kik Interactive, No. 19 
Civ. 5244 (AKH) at *6–8 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).  
 23. See infra Sections B & C. 
 24. Id.  
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functional tokens are delivered and platforms are launched, extends the 
application of the Supreme Court’s Howey test25 and thus the U.S. federal 
securities law post-launch and post-asset-delivery.  Second, it points toward 
two distinct and separate types of assets—a non-security-token (or coin) and 
a bond—simultaneously circulating after the project has been deployed and 
tokens distributed. 
Third, the two groups of asset purchasers—the Initial Investors who 
own tokens post-delivery and post-platform-launch and the subsequent token 
purchasers (“Public Token-Holders” or “Subsequent Token-Holders”)—
exist concurrently.  These two cohorts of market participants have completely 
divergent expectations concerning the role of the issuer in the operation of a 
platform or a Dapp and the valuation of digital assets.  The issuer-developer, 
on its part, has different obligations to each.  Only the bondholders can bring 
claims under securities law against the issuer in Stage Two.26   
This conceptual framework both differs from and contributes to the 
previous scholarship in the following way.  Some commentators have 
examined the hybrid nature of digital assets, which simultaneously present 
securities and non-securities attributes.27  Another notable view was 
expressed by Director Hinman in his consequential speech on digital assets, 
as well as by SEC Chairman Clayton: a digital-asset security can evolve into 
a non-security.28  It is also possible that because transactions are typically 
 
 25. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).  See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 
56, 61 (1990); SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004); H.R. REP. NO. 73–85, at 11 (1933). 
 26. See infra Section B. 
 27. Boreiko et al., supra note 9; Rohr & Wright, supra note 9, at 488.  A “token could be 
deemed both a security and a means of payment.”  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, at 
252.  APOLLINE BLANDIN, ANN SOFIE CLOOTS, HATIM HUSSAIN, MICHEL RAUCHS, RASHEED 
SALEUDDIN, JASON GRANT ALLEN, BRYAN ZHANG & KATHERINE CLOUD, GLOBAL CRYPTOASSET 
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE STUDY 21 (2019), https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/ 
user_upload/research/centres/alternative-finance/downloads/2019-04-ccaf-global-cryptoasset-
regulatory-landscape-study.pdf (describing “cryptoasset” as “an umbrella term to describe an array 
of tokens that exhibit a wide range of characteristics”).  Hybrid financial instruments are a known 
quantity in securities law and typically call for case-by-case analysis.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 88–89 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Reves, 494 U.S. at 62) (discussing a need for a 
case-by-case analysis of hybrids, such as diverse interests in LLCs, under Howey). 
 28. William Hinman, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey 
Met Gary (Plastic) (June 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418 
[hereinafter Hinman Speech] (“[T]he analysis of whether something is a security is not static and 
does not strictly inhere to the instrument.”); Nikhilesh De & Mahishan Gnanaseharan, SEC Chief 
Touts Benefits of Crypto Regulation, COINDESK (Apr. 5, 2018, 4:16 PM), 
https://www.coindesk.com/sec-chief-not-icos-bad; Cohen, supra note 9, at 102–06; Joseph H. 
Nesler, When it Comes to Analyzing Utility Tokens, the SEC Staff’s “Framework for ‘Investment 
Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets” May Be the Emperor Without Clothes (Or, Sometimes an 
Orange Is Just an Orange) (Part I), WINSTON & STRAWN LLP: CRYPTO LAW CORNER (Oct. 28, 
2019), https://www.winston.com/en/crypto-law-corner/index.html.  See also REGULATING 
BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 253 (Phillip Hacker, Ioannis Lianos, 
  
2020]   A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL-ASSET SECURITIES 173 
“evaluated on the basis of the content of the instruments in question, the 
purposes intended to be served, and the factual setting,”29 a project that 
started off as an investment could be reevaluated and transform into a non-
security.  In that case, some elements of the Howey test would no longer apply 
to a project or platform.30   
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
elaborated on the third view in SEC v. Telegram Group, Inc.31  This March 
2020 decision, which granted a preliminary injunction at the SEC’s request, 
held that the same security can be distributed to the Public Token-Holders by 
the Initial Investors acting as “underwriters.”32  The affiliated hypothesis is 
that there is a single financial instrument—a digital token—that is sold 
throughout this securities distribution scheme.  Similarly, in Kik Interactive, 
the Southern District of New York articulated a somewhat similar position 
by suggesting that 
Purchasers in the two sales [, a private placement of securities and 
a public sale of tokens,] received the same class of securities, 
fungible Kin that were equal in value.  It is true that they received 
them via different instruments with different rights.  However, the 
ultimate result was distribution of identical assets.33  
This Article seeks to resolve these issues by offering a workable 
framework that can assist factfinders, regulators, and market participants in 
determining when a relationship involving securities ends and commodity 
trading and use begins, as well as the parties involved.  Whereas digital assets 
can be securities, they also may be commodities or something else entirely.34  
Investment contracts are not cryptocurrency-commodities;35 and 
 
Georgios Dimitropoulos & Stefan Eich, eds., 1st ed. 2019) (comparing the Hinman Speech and the 
SAFT approach). 
 29. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 n.11 (1982) (“Each transaction must be 
analyzed and evaluated on the basis of the content of the instruments in question, the purposes 
intended to be served, and the factual setting as a whole.”). 
 30. See, e.g., THE SEC FRAMEWORK, supra note 3, at 5 (listing, inter alia, the following 
questions: “Whether or not the efforts of an AP, including any successor AP, continue to be 
important to the value of an investment in the digital asset.  Whether the network on which the 
digital asset is to function operates in such a manner that purchasers would no longer reasonably 
expect an AP to carry out essential managerial or entrepreneurial efforts.  Whether the efforts of an 
AP are no longer affecting the enterprise’s success.”). 
 31. Court Order, supra note 10. 
 32. See id. at *3; 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11).  
 33.  SEC v. Kik Interactive, No. 19 Civ. 5244 (AKH), 2020 WL 5819770, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
2020). 
 34. See Chamber’s Brief, supra note 6, at 9 (“Because a digital asset is merely an electronic 
record, the digital asset may be data that represents a security, a commodity, or something else.”); 
see also infra Section B. 
 35. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 475 (5th Cir. 1974); Sinva, Inc. 
v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).  
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cryptocurrencies native to open source decentralized blockchains, similar to 
the one at issue in Telegram, are typically considered commodities, not 
securities.36  Conflating distinct asset classes—commodities and 
securities37—may entail doctrinal inconsistencies and adverse market 
consequences, such as restricting beneficial innovation,38 as well as blur the 
jurisdictional boundaries between the SEC’s regulation of securities and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (“CFTC”) oversight of 
commodity markets.39   
This Article develops as follows.  Section B reviews the taxonomy of 
digital assets and offerings.40  It also lays out the two-stage process implicated 
by cryptoasset capital raising.  Section C examines an example of the two-
stage process—the Telegram case.41  Section D applies the two-stage 
framework to other examples of non-native and native tokens.42  Section E 
discusses equity-like crypto-instruments used in decentralized autonomous 
organizations, including The DAO and MakerDAO.43  Section F emphasizes 
the major concerns inherent during the project development phase and makes 
 
 36. Court Order, supra note 30, at *3–4 (“In the abstract, an investment of money in a 
cryptocurrency utilized by members of a decentralized community connected via blockchain 
technology, which itself is administered by this community of users rather than by a common 
enterprise, is not likely to be deemed a security under the familiar test laid out in S.E.C. v. W.J. 
Howey Co. . . . .  The SEC, for example, does not contend that Bitcoins transferred on the Bitcoin 
blockchain are securities.”); Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Release 
Number 8051-19 (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8051-19; see 
also Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 492, 498 
(D. Mass. 2018) (quoting Commodity Future Trading Commission v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 
213, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)) (“Virtual currencies can be regulated by CFTC as a commodity.”).  
 37. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975) (“What distinguishes a 
security transaction . . . is an investment where one parts with his money in the hope of receiving 
profits from the efforts of others, and not where he purchases a commodity for personal 
consumption . . . .”). 
 38. See, e.g., Peirce Speech and Proposal, supra note 8; Chamber’s Brief, supra note 6, at 6–9, 
11, 17. 
 39. In re BFXNA Inc., CFTC No. 16-19, at 5–6 (June 2, 2016), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legal
pleading/enfbfxnaorder060216.pdf (“[V]irtual currencies are encompassed in the [CEA] definition 
and properly defined as commodities . . . .”); In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-29, at 3 (Sept. 17, 
2015), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legal
pleading/enfcoinfliprorder09172015.pdf (”The definition of a ‘commodity’ is broad.  See, e.g. 
Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1982).  Bitcoin and other 
virtual currencies are encompassed in the definition and properly defined as commodities.”); 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(“Virtual currencies can be regulated by CFTC as a commodity.”). 
 40. See infra Section B.  
 41. See infra Section C.  
 42. See infra Section D.  
 43. See infra Section E.  
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a case for the important role securities law has to play in Stage One.44  Section 
G concludes the paper.45   
B. AN OVERVIEW OF TOKENS 
1. Token Taxonomy  
This Section outlines the short taxonomy of tokens and coins.  Their 
classifications are constantly evolving as new cryptocurrencies and other 
digital instruments are being developed.  The following discussion, albeit by 
no means an exhaustive anthology, lays out the main currently existing asset 
classes.  
1.1. Native and Non-native Tokens  
Many digital assets are “coins” and “tokens.”  The traditional view is 
that “coins” are payment-related digital assets, native to the blockchains on 
which they operate.  For example, Bitcoin blockchain has Bitcoin, Ethereum 
has Ether, Ripple has its XRP Ledger and XRP, a coin, and Telegram has 
developed Grams.46  Some experts refer to these assets as “native tokens” or 
“native assets,” i.e., tokens native to the underlying base layer protocols.47  
Ether, for instance, may be described as the “native token” of Ethereum 
blockchain.  Just like Bitcoin, it is also a digital currency (or 
“cryptocurrency”) and a commodity.48  A native token, however, may also be 
utilized for purposes other than payments, unit of account, or store of value.   
Ether, for instance, is used to pay for “gas”49 to power all transactions 
and smart contracts50 (i.e., sets of code commands that are the core business 
 
 44.   See infra Section F. 
 45. See infra Section G.  
 46. BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2020); ETHEREUM, 
https://ethereum.org/what-is-ethereum/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2020); XRP: The Best Digital Asset 
for Global Payment, RIPPLE, https://ripple.com/xrp/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2020); Court Order, supra 
note 10. 
 47. A protocol is “a set of instructions for the compilation and interaction of objects.”  
ALEXANDER R. GALLOWAY, PROTOCOL: HOW CONTROL EXISTS AFTER DECENTRALIZATION 75 
(2004). 
 48. Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, supra note 36. 
 49. See VITALIK BUTERIN, A NEXT GENERATION SMART CONTRACT & DECENTRALIZED 
APPLICATION PLATFORM, GITHUB (2013), https://ethereum.org/en/whitepaper/ [hereinafter 
Ethereum White Paper] (discussing the use of gas). 
 50. Smart contracts are algorithms enabling automatic transaction execution.  See, e.g., Nick 
Szabo, The Idea of Smart Contracts, NICK SZABO’S ESSAYS, PAPERS AND CONCISE TUTORIALS 
(1997), 
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwintersch
ool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_idea.html; Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 5, at 379–
88; Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36 YALE J. ON 
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logic of decentralized applications (also “Dapps”) and decentralized 
autonomous organizations (“DAOs”))51 on Ethereum.  This Article discusses 
examples of Dapps and DAOs in Sections D and E, respectively.52 
Many developers working on smart contracts, Dapps, and DAOs 
economize on their resources by building their projects on established 
blockchains such as Ethereum.  Ethereum has the resources enabling smart 
contract development and non-native token offerings.53  In layman’s terms, 
Ethereum provides a platform for building non-native digital tokens and 
deploying smart contracts, Dapps, and DAOs; gas is similar to a transaction 
fee compensating for computational expenses and validation of transactions 
executed on Ethereum.  Tokens, in turn, give their holders the right to access 
Dapps and DAOs and to effect various transactions, including purchases and 
sales of goods and services, voting on projects, consumption of goods, etc.54   
1.2. Functional and Regulatory Classifications 
Tokens are often distributed during or after crowdfunding events such 
as Initial Coin Offerings (“ICO”) and Security Token Offerings (“STO”).55  
For instance, Telegram planned to deliver native tokens after an ICO.56  These 
crowdfunding events ended up on the radar of capital market regulators 
across the globe as novel and exoteric securities offerings.   
Some regulators have taxonomized tokens into “investment tokens” or 
“security tokens,” which are self-explanatory sobriquets; a less exact 
appellation of “utility tokens” granting access to, inter alia, products, 
services and networks; and tokens used strictly for payment and exchange 
 
REG. 735, 744 n.30 (2019) (discussing smart contract applications); Wright & De Filippi, supra 
note 9, at 10–12. 
 51. See, e.g., Christoph Jentzsch, Decentralized Autonomous Organization to Automate 
Governance 1–2 (2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.coursehero.com/file/45767105/IT4pdf/; Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 5, at 379–89; 
Wright & De Filippi, supra note 9, at 3, 19–20; Vitalik Buterin, DAOs, DACs, DAs and More: An 
Incomplete Terminology Guide, ETHEREUM BLOG (May 6, 2014), 
https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-and-more-an-incomplete-terminology-guide/; 
Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 350–51 (2017) 
(discussing Ethereum and The DAO). 
 52. See infra Sections D & E.  
 53. Ethereum White Paper, supra note 46. 
 54. See, e.g., BLANDIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 14–21; see infra Sections C & D. 
 55. See, e.g., Michael Mendelson, From Initial Coin Offerings to Security Tokens: A U.S. 
Federal Securities Law Analysis, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 52 (2019); STEVE DAVIES, HENRI 
ARSLANIAN, KRIS KERSEY, GÜNTHER DOBRAUZ, JONAS HEYDASCH, HENRIK OLSSON, JOHN 




 56. See infra Section C. 
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purposes.57  Security tokens are digital assets that have security-like 
characteristics, i.e., those that are the “same as or akin to traditional 
instruments like shares, debentures or units in a collective investment 
scheme.”58  A related category is “governance tokens,” which enable 
participants of a digital project to have a voice in its governance by voting on 
various proposals and changes associated with the project.59  They may be 
roughly analogized with partnership interests or memberships in limited 
liability companies.60   
These classifications are not ironclad because some virtual assets can be 
used as a means of exchange and function as currencies or participation and 
voting rights.61  To wit, these assets may combine features of several asset 
classes62 and represent hybrids.63  Some assets may lose certain 
characteristics at various stages of a business project.64   
1.3. Fungible and Non-Fungible Tokens 
Governance tokens, utility tokens, coins, and security-tokens are 
“fungible” assets, just like U.S. dollars, shares of common stock of IBM, or 
identical bricks of gold.  Many fungible non-native tokens are built using 
Ethereum’s ERC-20 standard and deployed on Ethereum, the base layer 
 
 57. UK FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, GUIDANCE ON CRYPTOASSETS 35–44 (July 2019), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps19-22.pdf [hereinafter FCA GUIDANCE]; BLANDIN ET 
AL., supra note 27, at 18–20, 37; L. LIB. OF CONG., REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY AROUND 
THE WORLD (2018), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/cryptocurrency-world-
survey.pdf. 
 58. FCA GUIDANCE, supra note 57, at 15.  
 59. Alexis Collomb, Primavera De Fillippi & Klara Sok, Blockchain Technology and Financial 
Regulation: A Risk-Based Approach to the Regulation of ICOs, 10 EUR. J. RISK REG. 263, 263–64, 
280–81 (2019); Alexandra Sims, Blockchain and Decentralised Autonomous Organisations 
(DAOs): The Evolution of Companies?, 28 N.Z. U. L. REV. 423, 440–41 (2020) (discussing 
examples).  See also Del Wright Jr., Quadratic Voting and Blockchain Governance, 88 UMKC L. 
REV. 475,484–94 (2019) (discussing distributed governance).  
 60. See infra Section E. 
 61. See generally supra note 59. 
 62. Rohr & Wright, supra note 9, at 493. 
 63. Collomb et al., supra note 59.  For a review of distinctions among various digital asset 
types, see also Rohr & Wright, supra note 9, at 470–85; Philipp Hacker & Chris Thomale, Crypto-
Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law, 15 EUR. 
CO. & FIN. L. REV. 645 (2018); SATIS GROUP, CRYPTOASSET MARKET COVERAGE INITIATION: 
NETWORK CREATION 6, 16 (2018), https://research.bloomberg.com/pub/res/d28giW28tf6G7T_ 
Wr77aU0gDgFQ (summarizing several examples of tokens); Goforth, Securities Treatment of 
Tokenized Offerings, supra note 9, at 416–18, 434–36. 
 64. See, e.g., In re Gladius Network LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 10608, 2019 WL 697993, 
at 1–4 [hereinafter Gladius Order] (discussing the nature of the tokens and the process of raising 
capital). 
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protocol.65  As mentioned above, Ethereum has designed standards for the 
issuance and operation of non-native tokens.  ERC-20 is one of the first and 
main code standards.   
The ERC-20 standard ensures uniform performance of non-native 
tokens and their transferability.66  ERC-20 tokens have some convenient 
standard functions, including transferring from one account to another, 
storing the tokens, checking the balances of token-owners, and setting and 
monitoring the total supply of the tokens.67  ERC-20 tokens can also have 
additional, non-standard functions specific to a project.  To summarize, ERC-
20 is a set of terms that a smart contract (which at its core is encoded 
commands) should include.  The result, in simple terms, is akin to creating 
bricks of gold, bonds, shares of stock, or other assets online and letting some 
computer code do the distribution, check the balances, and serve as a transfer 
agent for these assets.   
ERC-20 was among the first and most basic code standards.  More 
recently, the plethora of ERC-1400 tokens emerged.68  These technological 
developments went hand in hand with laws and regulations that either 
encouraged digital asset innovation or constrained it, thereby incentivizing 
the developers to work on finding solutions.  For instance, it is possible that 
digital asset developers saw an opportunity in corporate law reforms such as 
the 2017 amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law concerning 
issuance of tokenized shares.69  At the same time, the SEC actions against 
ICO-issuers who failed to comply with federal securities law70 posed serious 
regulatory challenges and moved developers toward thinking about 
innovations in compliance: A group of crypto-firms created the ERC-1400 
standards with the objective of accommodating the needs of firms seeking to 
issue and transfer equity and/or debt securities using on-chain and off-chain 
data.71   
 
 65. See, e.g., Dafan Zhang, Security Tokens: Complying with Security Laws and Regulations 
Provides More than Token Rewards, 88 UMKC L. REV. 323, 340–44 (2019). 
 66. Id.; see also Michael J. O’Connor, Overreaching Its Mandate? Considering the SEC’s 
Authority to Regulate Cryptocurrency Exchanges, 11 DREXEL L. REV. 539, 551–52 (2019); Azgad-
Tromer, supra note 9, at 82; Cohney et al., supra note 3, at 605; Tonya M. Evans, Cryptokitties, 
Cryptography, and Copyright, 47 AIPLA Q.J. 219, 247–48 (2019). 
 67. Fabian Vogelsteller & Vitalik Buterin, EIP 20: ERC-20 Token Standard, ETHEREUM: 
ETHEREUM IMPROVEMENT PROPOSALS (2015), https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20. 
 68. Zhang, supra note 65, at 341–42. 
 69. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 224. 
 70. Guseva, Game Theory, supra note 7. 
 71. THE SECURITY TOKEN STANDARD, https://polymath.network/erc-1400 (last visited Nov. 
22, 2020); Tim Fries, How the ERC-1400 Has Evolved Into a Suite of Interoperable Security Token 
Standards, TOKENIST (last updated Sept. 15, 2019), https://thetokenist.io/how-the-erc-1400-has-
evolved-into-a-suite-of-interoperable-security-token-standards/. 
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For instance, instead of doing a conventional public offering, a firm 
could follow these standards and issue security-tokens.  The ERC-1400 
developers have promised that the standards would help ensure compliance 
with securities law.  Such security-tokens would be similar to good old shares 
of stock or bonds except their new blockchain wrapping.  Conveniently, these 
standards are backward-compatible with ERC-20.72   
As a final wrinkle, fungible ERC-20 or other tokens differ from 
nonfungible tokens and “identity tokens” that are based on different 
standards: (1) ERC-721,73 and (2) ERC-725 and ERC-735,74 respectively.  In 
short, ERC-721 enables developers create unique digital assets and sell 
collectibles.75  Identity tokens (ERC-725 and ERC-735) have emerged to 
store data about an individual, a group, or a firm and to verify information 
about potential counterparties.76  Identity tokens help to streamline 
information verification in various contracts and transactions.  For instance, 
these innovations may facilitate creation of peer-to-peer marketplaces, such 
as Airbnb, except that there is no Airbnb, as such, to verify the identities of a 
renter and an owner.   
To summarize, tokens and coins are constantly evolving because 
blockchain is merely an umbrella technology that may be adapted for 
multiple and heterogeneous business purposes.  The rest of this Article 
discusses the assets that fall under the headings of fungible coins and tokens, 
including security, utility, and governance tokens.  These tokens enable users 
to, among other things, access applications, vote on projects, enjoy financial 
dividend-like or interest-like return on their investments, validate 
transactions, purchase goods and services on the network, or store value. 
2. The Two Stages of Digital Asset Markets 
A developer working on a smart contract, a new blockchain, a DAO or 
a Dapp, naturally needs to raise capital.77  Like any other entrepreneur, a 
crypto-firm could seek funding from venture capital firms and other 
 
 72. Adam Dossa, Pablo Ruiz, Fabian Vogelsteller & Stephane Gosselin, Comment to ERC 
1400: Security Token Standard, GITHUB (Sept. 13, 2018), https://github.com/ethereum/eips/ 
issues/1411. 
 73. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 66, at 248. 
 74. See ERC-725 ALLIANCE, https://erc725alliance.org/. 
 75. Evans, supra note 66, at 253–54. 
 76. See ERC-725 ALLIANCE, supra note 74. 
 77. Promoters use technology to raise capital and start new businesses. Rodrigues, supra note 
9, at 721 (“So far most ICOs and DAOs have not organized purely on the blockchain.  Instead they 
have opted for some identifiable group of promoters.”); Rohr & Wright, supra note 10, at 485 (“In 
effect, the distributive power of the Internet is being combined with the raw power of a blockchain 
to manage and transfer assets globally.  This combination has extraordinary potential for capital 
formation, streamlining a once cumbersome process of raising funding while holding out the hope 
of democratizing access to capital by unleashing untapped entrepreneurship.”). 
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sophisticated investors.78  It could do a private placements or conduct a public 
offering of securities.79  This is when Stage One of the project begins.   
A firm-developer would issue and sell “digital-asset securities”80 to 
investors either in two-party transactions involving only the issuer and the 
investors (i.e., ICOs81 and STOs82) or through third-party intermediaries, 
popularly called “crypto-exchanges,” in Initial Exchange Offerings 
(“IEOs”).83   
 
 78. See, e.g., Jonathan Cardenas, The Rise of the Crypto Asset Investment Fund: An Overview 
of the Crypto Fund System, in BLOCKCHAIN & CRYPTOCURRENCY REG. 149–155 (Josias Dewey 
ed., 2019).  
 79. By December 2018, ICOs raised about $20 billion.  See Justina Lee, How Much Have ICOs 
Raised in 2018? Depends on Who You Ask, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 4, 2018, 7:00 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-05/how-much-have-token-sales-raised-in-
2018-depends-on-who-you-ask; see also Paul Vigna, Raising Money in the Crypto World Has 
Gotten a Lot Harder, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/raising-
money-in-the-crypto-world-has-gotten-a-lot-harder-11554037201; Zetzsche et al., supra note 12 
(arguing that many ICOs were scams and that ICOs arose in response to inadequate start-up 
financing). 
 80. This term has been used by the SEC in ICO cases in relation to cryptoassets.  See, e.g., 
Complaint at 1, SEC v. Telegram Group Inc., No. 9-cv-09439-PKC (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2019/comp-pr2019-212.pdf. 
 81. See, e.g., Complaint at 7–8, SEC v. Blockvest LLC, 3:18-cv-02287-GPC-BLM (S.D. Cal. 
2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2018/comp-pr2018-232.pdf [hereinafter 
Blockvest Complaint] (“[D]igital assets issued in an ICO entitle holders to certain rights related to 
a venture underlying the ICO, such as rights to profits, shares of assets, rights to use certain services 
provided by the issuer, and/or voting rights.  These digital assets may also be listed on online 
platforms, often called virtual currency exchanges, and tradeable for virtual or fiat currencies.”); 
Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCH. COMM’N: INV. ALERTS AND 
BULLS. (July 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_coinofferings.  
On the ICO structure and regulations, see, e.g., Moran Ofir & Ido Sadeh, ICO vs. IPO: Empirical 
Findings, Information Asymmetry and the Appropriate Regulatory Framework, 53 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 525 (2019) (summarizing about a hundred empirical papers); Kaal, supra note 9; 
Boreiko et al., supra note 9; Philipp Maume & Mathias Fromberger, Regulation of Initial Coin 
Offerings: Reconciling U.S. and E.U. Securities Laws, 19 CHI. J. INT’L L. 548 (2019); Guseva, 
Game Theory, supra note 7; Collomb et al., supra note 59; Sabrina T. Howell, Marina Niessner & 
David Yermack, Initial Coin Offerings: Financing Growth with Cryptocurrency Token Sales 33 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24774, 2019), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24774. 
 82. On sales of security tokens, see, e.g., Goforth, Contractual Ordering, supra note 9, at 18-
20 (discussing examples); Goforth, Securities Treatment of Tokenized Offerings, supra note 9; 
Collomb, et al., supra note 59, at 294–96; Complete Guide to Security Tokens, TOKENIST (2018), 
https://thetokenist.io/security-tokens-explained/; Joshua A. Klayman, Mutually Assured 
Disruption: The Rise of the Security Token, in BLOCKCHAIN & CRYPTOCURRENCY REG. 60 (Josias 
Dewey ed., 2019) (discussing a pertinent example). 
 83. Investor Bulletin: Initial Exchange Offerings (IEOs) – Investor Alert, U.S. SECURITIES & 
EXCH. COMM’N: INV. ALERTS AND BULLS. (Jan. 14, 2020), ’https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-
alerts-and-bulletins/ia_initialexchangeofferings (“IEOs are being touted as an innovation on ICOs 
because they are offered directly by online trading platforms on behalf of companies—usually for 
a fee—to provide immediate trading opportunities for the digital assets.”). 
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The issuer needs to offer some form of financial instruments ensuring 
return on the investment to the parties providing capital.  If the developer 
offers instruments that are not equity, the obvious alternative is debt 
securities, which have infinite variations.84  Regardless of titles appended 
thereto,85 the SEC generally considers these financial instruments securities 
under federal securities law.86  This approach is bolstered by the broad 
statutory interpretation of investments87 and by some economic research 
suggesting that when firms raise capital through token sales, these offerings 
exhibit properties characteristic of securities issuances.88   
The offering documents would typically promise return in the form of 
tokens.  The Initial Investors would receive tokens in exchange for their 
investment either during project development or at project completion and 
launch.  The rest of the market would often get access to the tokens sold in 
public sales by the issuer after the launch or through secondary market 
trading.89   
The native or non-native tokens would thereafter be used for various 
purposes: to enable the exchange of goods and services, to effect payments, 
to vote on projects, to participate in project governance, to stake tokens and 
validate transactions, to access the network, to deploy and run Dapps and 
DAOs, to store value, and many others.90  Token-holders may also be entitled 
to a share of fees from transactions and services executed on a platform, 
Dapp, or DAO after its launch.91   
 
 84. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 16. 
 85. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (“‘(I)n searching for the 
meaning and scope of the word ‘security’ in the Act(s), form should be disregarded for substance 
and the emphasis should be on economic reality’ . . ..” (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 
336 (1967)). 
 86. For discussion of relevant case law and no-action letters, see, e.g., Guseva, Game Theory, 
supra note 7. 
 87. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004) (“‘Congress’ purpose in enacting the securities 
laws was to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are 
called.’”) (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990) (emphasis in original)). 
 88. See, e.g., Evgeny Lyandres, Berardino Palazzo & Daniel Rabetti, Do Tokens Behave like 
Securities? An Anatomy of Initial Coin Offerings 3 (Apr. 2019) (unpublished manuscript) 
https://www.idc.ac.il/en/schools/business/annual-conference/documents/2019-annual-
conference/do-tokens-behave-like-securities-lyandres.pdf (finding similarities between the 
behavior of digital assets issued in ICOs and equity securities but also cautioning that “this 
comparison does not imply that issuing public equity is a viable alternative to an ICO”). 
 89. For examples, see infra Sections C & D.  See also Howell et al., supra note 81; Ofir & 
Sadeh, supra note 81. 
 90. See supra Section B.1. 
 91. Id.  For specific examples, see Gladius Order, supra note 64; Blockvest Complaint, supra 
note 81; Blockstack PBC, Offering Circular 8–11 (July 11, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1693656/000110465919039908/a18-15736_1253g2.htm 
[hereinafter Blockstack Circular].  See also Introducing UNI, UNISWAP (Sept. 16, 2020), 
https://uniswap.org/blog/uni/ (discussing governance tokens distribution). 
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There are several cases where, post-launch and post-asset-delivery, the 
issuer-developer ceases functioning as the central and sole locus of 
governance for the project.  For instance, consider first the blockchains which 
are decentralized, open-source, and permissionless.  Any third-party 
developer, to wit, not merely the issuer-developer, can build upon these 
platforms, while transaction validation and decision-making are determined 
by broad consensus protocols.92  Changes in such blockchains are not within 
the sole control of the issuer-developer.   
By way of example, the offering documents for the first ever Regulation 
A offering of digital-asset securities by Blockstack PBC and its subsidiary 
specifically anticipated such scenarios.  The offering documents projected 
that there could be “a new security and new token which Blockstack has not 
issued, claims no responsibility over, and will not support with upgrades” if, 
without its approval, through upgrades and hard forks,93 a different network 
was created.94  The issuer-developer thus expected (and the market was on 
notice) that after capital-raising, platform development and launch, the issuer 
could lose its initial position as the locus of governance with respect to the 
platform and tokens.   
Another commonplace expectation in crypto is that digital asset 
transactions would be immutable, and the issuer-developers would not be 
able to modify the underlying code.95  To be sure, these representations and 
expectations can be false in some cases.  Immutability of DLT is a possibility 
that “is definitely not yet firmly established.”96  Immutability depends, inter 
alia, on validation and consensus protocols, while smart contracts can be 
upgradable by a developer.97  The rationale behind the modifications of a 
 
 92. For a discussion of governance systems, see, e.g., Angela Walch, The Path of the 
Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law), 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 713, 735–45 (2017) [hereinafter 
Walch, Blockchain Lexicon]; Patrick Murck, Who Controls the Blockchain?, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Apr. 19, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/04/who-controls-the-blockchain; Reyes, (Un)Corporate 
Crypto-Governance, supra note 19, at 1886–88, 1913–14. 
 93. “Hard fork” is essentially a split of a blockchain. Murck, supra note 92. 
 94. Blockstack Circular, supra note 91, at 11.  
 95. See, e.g., Cohney et al., supra note 3, at 615–17; 630–38 (discussing the claims and realities 
of code modifiability); Azgad-Tromer, supra note 9, at 98 (“Unlike traditional contracts that are 
subject to enforcement by courts, smart contracts are technically immutable: automatically enforced 
according to their original code with no allowance for ex post discretion.”); Kyung Taeck Minn, 
Towards Enhanced Oversight of “Self-Governing” Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: 
Case Study of the Dao and its Shortcomings, 9 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 139, 152 (“The 
purpose of the Ethereum blockchain and The DAO, after all, was to provide an immutable 
transactional record and host smart contracts that would solve the principal-agent problem.”). 
 96. Walch, Blockchain Lexicon, supra note 92, at 743.  For a related discussion, see id. at 735–
45. 
 97. See, e.g., Cohney et al., supra note 3, at 630–38 (discussing modifiability of smart 
contracts). For an overview of Ethereum “hard fork,” see, e.g., Murck, supra note 92; Rodrigues, 
supra note 9, at 705–706. 
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smart contract may be economically efficient and legitimate, including 
discovering a bug and vulnerability in the code98 or new use cases for a 
particular app.  In a modified smart contract, the existing variables, functions, 
and data should remain, but some new data or functions may be added.  
Limitations on updating may, of course, be encoded in a smart contract.   
The next example is representations (or misrepresentations)99 in 
whitepapers stating that the prices and trading of digital assets would be 
determined by formulas encoded in smart contracts, auctions, independent 
price-setting oracle feeds, or the forces of supply and demand,100 i.e., not by 
the issuer-developer.  Even when developers retain a certain number of 
tokens,101 which may affect the supply and/or give the developer more voting 
power, these transgressions are often kept in check through lockup 
agreements and vesting conditions imposed on the developer’s team in the 
offering materials.102   
In toto, the ultimate expectations are that transactions in digital assets 
be immutable and transparent, and the code “independent” of the developers 
because users do not want to trust issuer-developers in a trustless system 
based on code.103  As the promoter’s governance role diminishes or becomes 
 
 98. See infra Section E(1) (discussing problems with The DAO). 
 99. Research and SEC enforcement actions demonstrate that contrary to issuer representations, 
issuers could influence the functionality, supply, and value of their assets after the sales.  See, e.g., 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Charges Against Leaders 
of “Onecoin,” a Multibillion-Dollar Pyramid Scheme Involving the Sale of a Fraudulent 
Cryptocurrency (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-
announces-charges-against-leaders-onecoin-multibillion-dollar; Complaint at 3–14, United States 
v. Konstantin Ignatov, No. 1:17-cr-00630-ER (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/1141986/download; Complaint, SEC v. 
AriseBank, No. 3:18-cv-00186-M (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2018/comp-pr2018-8.pdf; SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, No. 
18CV2287-GPB(BLM), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200773, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2018); SEC v. 
Blockvest, LLC, No. 18CV2287-GPB(BLM), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24446, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 
14, 2019); Cohney et al., supra note 3, at 630–38, 640. 
 100. See, e.g., Gladius Order, supra note 64; Blockvest Complaint, supra note 81; Blockstack 
Circular, supra note 91; MAKERDAO, THE MAKER PROTOCOL: MAKERDAO’S MULTI-
COLLATERAL DAI (MCD) SYSTEM, https://makerdao.com/whitepaper/White%20Paper%20-
The%20Maker%20Protocol_%20MakerDAO’s%20Multi-
Collateral%20Dai%20(MCD)%20System-FINAL-%20021720.pdf [hereinafter MakerDAO 
Whitepaper]; Metronome, Owner’s Manual, GITHUB (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://github.com/autonomoussoftware/documentation/blob/master/owners_manual/owners_man
ual.md (discussing “daily auctions that provide an on-going token supply mintage”); Bridget Marsh 
& Josias Dewey, The Loan Market, Blockchain, and Smart Contracts: The Potential for 
Transformative Change, in BLOCKCHAIN & CRYPTOCURRENCY REG. 6–8 (Josias Dewey ed., 2019). 
 101. This is a usual practice.  See, e.g., Metronome, Owner’s Manual, supra note 100 (the 
founders retained 20% of the initial auction supply); Court Order, supra note 10, at *14–16. 
 102. See, e.g., infra Section C; Cohney et al., supra note 3, at 614, 627–28. 
 103. See, e.g., Cohney et al., supra note 3, at 612 (“[I]t is the immutable, transparent code that 
enables (and creates) a trustless but trusted market.”); Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer 
Electronic Cash System, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf; Ofir & Sadeh, supra note 81, at 9; 
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nonexistent, the autonomous and decentralized Stage Two begins.  Logically, 
the next question is: What happens to the original debt securities and their 
holders during Stage Two? 
3.  Howey and Bonds 
As the issuer-developer’s role in project governance tapers off, do the 
original bonds still exist and do securities laws apply?  As discussed in the 
Introduction, in determining whether a digital asset is a security, the SEC and 
federal courts routinely apply the Supreme Court’s infinitely malleable 
Howey test.104  The never passé 80-year-old Howey consists of four prongs: 
(1) investment of money (2) in a common enterprise (3) with a reasonable 
expectation of profits (4) derived from the efforts of others.105  Put simply, 
the test presumes that there is a firm, the locus of governing authority in 
which investors place their trust and invest money to generate future cash 
flows and return on investment.  For securities law, Howey is old 
Weltanschauung.  For nearly eight decades, Howey has been regarded as a 
blanket economic reality test that fills the interstices left in the statutory 
framework and between more common securities such as shares of stock, 
notes, and others.106   
For the purposes of this analysis and the two-stage process, the most 
important prongs of Howey are (1) a reasonable expectation of profits, which 
are (2) derived through managerial efforts of others.107  The SEC and 
commentators writing on digital assets often focus on these prongs, 
particularly, the efforts of others.108  Henderson and Raskin dubbed it “the 
Bahamas test”:109 would management’s decamping to the Bahamas 
undermine the underlying enterprise?  Similarly, speeches by the SEC staff110 
 
Rodrigues, supra note 9, at 682 (“Once the code is released into the world, its programmers can no 
longer unilaterally alter it——unless the widely-dispersed, anonymous blockchain community can 
be convinced to do so.  Because of the decentralized, distributed nature of the blockchain ledger, 
changes in the code will be rejected unless the code itself contemplates subsequent modifications.”). 
 104. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 
(1990); SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 389–90 (2004). 
 105. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. 
 106. Id. at 299; Reves, 494 U.S. at 61; Edwards, 540 U.S. at 389–90. 
 107. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301; United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). 
 108. The DAO Report, for instance, focused on the promoters’ pre-offering efforts and their 
post-offering efforts. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 14–15 (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter The 
DAO Report], https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf. 
 109. M. Todd Henderson & Max Raskin, A Regulatory Classification of Digital Assets: Toward 
an Operational Howey Test for Cryptocurrencies, ICOs, and Other Digital Assets, 2 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 443, 461 (2019). 
 110. Hinman Speech, supra note 28 (laying out thirteen additional factors, many of which are 
related to the efforts of promoters).  
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and the April 2019 Framework developed by the SEC Strategic Hub for 
Innovation and Financial Technology (“FinHub”) underscore the “efforts of 
others” as an important factor in finding a digital asset is a security.111   
The inquiry, however, should not stop there because Howey is a holistic 
test.112 To the extent that it focuses on the expectations of investors, it is 
crucial to run the following inquiry: What should happen if and when an 
investor no longer expected that the firm’s management would generate the 
return on her original investment?  In this case, as the efforts of other prongs 
collapsed, Howey would be rendered inapplicable.  Therefore, in finding a 
security, one must look at the timing of the expectations of investors.113  Put 
another way, when might an issuer “decamp to the Bahamas” without 
undermining the expectations of the investors under an investment 
agreement? 
Let us examine this idea through the example of debt securities.  In a 
typical offering, bondholders (or debenture-holders) get either regular 
coupon payments or one single payment at maturity.  In the latter case, the 
debt instruments are “zero-coupon” bonds.114  There are typically multiple 
covenants in a prospectus describing the issuer and the securities and an 
indenture stipulating the contractual obligations of the contracting parties.  
Often, there is also a trustee to guard the rights of bondholders.115   
In crypto, by contrast, Initial Investors often receive the digital assets 
(tokens or coins) the developer was working on instead of either regular 
coupon payments or the implicit interest on a zero-coupon bond, as well as 
 
 111. THE SEC FRAMEWORK, supra note 3, at 3 (“[T]he main issue in analyzing a digital asset 
under the Howey test is whether a purchaser has a reasonable expectation of profits (or other 
financial returns) derived from the efforts of others.”).  
 112. Howey, 328 U.S. at 293, 299–300. 
 113. See, e.g., THE SEC FRAMEWORK, supra note 3, at 8 (suggesting the need for this analysis 
but not specifying the exact timing). 
 114. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 16; Stewart M. Robertson, Debenture Holders and the 
Indenture Trustee: Controlling Managerial Discretion in the Solvent Enterprise, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 461, 463 (“The typical debenture holder can expect a fixed semi-annual payment of 
interest on his investment and the return of his principal.  The rights of the debenture holder are 
ascertained at the time of his investment.”); Michael Hartzmark et al., Fraud on the Market: 
Analysis of the Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 654, 668 
(2011). 
 115. See, e.g., Hartzmark et al., supra note 114, at 674 (listing examples of covenants); James 
Gadsden, Introduction to the Annotated Trust Indenture Act, 67 BUS. LAW. 977, 985–87, 981–82, 
989 (2012) (discussing indentures and duties of trustees); James J. Park, Bondholders and Securities 
Class Actions, 99 MINN. L. REV. 585, 592–93 (2014) (observing that both the use of covenants and 
the trustees are not fully efficient); Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade & Marcel Kahan, A New 
Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 470 (1999) (suggesting a 
supertrustee to solve problems with trustees); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Corporate 
Governance for a Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1335, 
1339 (2017). 
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the principal paid in a fiat currency.116  The terminal value of these digital 
assets and their yield to maturity, if measured in a fiat currency, would be 
highly uncertain at the time when a bondholder entered into this agreement.   
What is the timing for the performance of this investment contract and 
what is the term to maturity?  Maturity of the underlying bonds may have at 
least two meanings.  One meaning of maturity is the delivery of fully 
functional tokens or coins to the Initial Investors.  Indeed, this is what 
happens in conventional bond offerings: when a bond reaches maturity, the 
investor receives the terminal payment and the contractual relationship is at 
an end.   
Alas, this conventional term to maturity is inapplicable in crypto 
because the “coupon” and principal are repaid in tokens.  The contractual 
investment relationship does not necessarily terminate (or expire) on token 
delivery if the issuer has yet to complete certain obligations under the 
indenture.  In that case, even when a platform is open source and 
decentralized and assets are fully functional, the Initial Investors may 
reasonably expect the issuer-developer to build on the platform, advertise the 
assets, improve the token ecosystem, and contribute to digital asset 
appreciation.117  Depending on the timing of this expectation and the relevant 
efforts of the issuer-developer, the Howey test may apply post-delivery and 
post-launch.   
Maturity of debt securities thus may be determined in relation to 
investment contract performance.  The timing of the promised contractual 
performance would mark the point in time when a reasonable investor (which 
is an objective test)118 would no longer expect the firm-developer to provide 
services to promote the digital asset and/or its ecosystem.  There is no reason 
why this contractual expectation would not survive the delivery of functional 
tokens and/or launch of a platform.   
By contrast, the rest of the market is not party to this bilateral 
relationship between the Initial Investors and the issuer-developer.  The 
latecomers generally receive access to already fully functional tokens (or 
coins).  These Subsequent Token-Holders are supposed to use the ultimate 
tokens (or coins) for their intended purposes, including exchange of goods 
and services, building applications, and others.119   
The original indenture has no bearing on the expectations and purposes 
of the Subsequent Token-Holders.  To them, the original issuer-developer 
 
 116. See infra Sections C & D.  On the variety of ICOs, see, e.g., Zetzsche et al, supra note 14, 
at 276-77. 
 117. For related analysis and arguments, see, e.g., Court Order, supra note 10, at *15, *52; SEC 
v. Kik Interactive, No. 19 Civ. 5244 (AKH), 2020 WL 5819770, at *3, *5, *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). 
 118. See infra note 192. 
 119. Chamber’s Brief, supra note 6, at 4. 
  
2020]   A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL-ASSET SECURITIES 187 
owes no additional contractual obligations under the investment agreements, 
nor should they reasonably expect any extra efforts from it to support the 
platform.  Unless an Initial Investor sold their bonds or assigned the interest 
under the bonds to the Subsequent Token-Holders, the latter’s view on what 
the issuer-developer is obligated to do under the indenture and the 
corresponding timing of performance would be entirely irrelevant.   
If the Initial Investor continued to own the delivered tokens post-launch, 
they and the late-coming Subsequent Token-Holders would use the tokens 
for similar purposes and value the same asset and platform qualities, such as 
token utility, third-party developer activity, network functionalities, liquidity, 
user-base externalities, and transaction activity, among others.120  All the 
while, however, the Initial Investor would also expect profit from and have 
claims under the indenture against the issuer-developer.   
As a result, the two cohorts of market participants overlap in the post-
launch public market for delivered tokens, and the two asset classes (a bond 
and a token) exist concurrently until the bonds’ maturity date. To reiterate, 
for the Subsequent Token-Holders, it is always the post-launch fully 
functional, autonomous, decentralized, and, depending on circumstances, 
permissionless and open-source Stage Two that does not trigger securities 
law.  The debt securities of the Initial Investors, however, still do give rise to 
the application of securities regulation. 121 











 120. See, e.g., Howell et al., supra note 81, at 3–4, 30 (finding that survival and employment of 
ICO issuers is related to asset utility and liquidity); Lin William Cong, Ye Li & Neng Wang, 
Tokenomics: Dynamic Adoption and Valuation 8–12 (Becker Friedman Inst., Working Paper No. 
2018-49, 2018), at 8–12, https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/WP_2018-49.pdf; see also 
Expert Rebuttal Report of Stephen B. McKeon, Ph.D., SEC v. Telegram Group Inc., No. 1:19-cv-
09439-PKC (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2020), at 17 [hereinafter McKeon Report]. 
 121. This conclusion comports with the Howey analysis.  See THE SEC FRAMEWORK, supra note 
3, at 5–6.  This proposed conceptual understanding differs from the SAFT Framework, which does 
not fully acknowledge an overlap in the stages one and two and the perspectives of different types 
of asset purchasers. 
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C.  EXAMINING THE TELEGRAM CASE 
1. Facts and History  
This Section dissects the two-stage process using the example of the 
offering of native tokens (“Grams”) by Telegram.  This gigantic global 
offering of digital assets has been the subject of a 2019-20 battle in the 
Southern District of New York.122   
As background, Telegram intended to develop a new “TON 
Blockchain”123 with Grams serving as its native tokens.  In 2018, Telegram 
conducted an ICO and successfully raised approximately $1.7 billion.  The 
offering was—allegedly—conducted under the exemptions from registration 
under Regulation D124 and Regulation S.125  Investors entered into “Gram 
Purchase Agreements” (“GPAs”) that, as Telegram admitted, were 
investment contracts.126  The contracts stipulated that Telegram would 
deliver “Grams,” a new cryptocurrency, by the end of October 2019.  
Telegram claimed that these ultimate Grams would be a cryptocurrency and 
a native token of its new TON Blockchain, while the first GPAs were 
securities.127   
The SEC took exception to this approach and argued that the to-be-
developed and delivered cryptocurrency would also be a security.  On 
October 11, 2019, the SEC filed an emergency application for a temporary 
restraining order (“TRO”) in the Southern District of New York preventing 
Telegram from delivering Grams to investors under the GPAs.128  Telegram 
 
 122. Order to Show Cause, Temporary Restraining Order, and Order Granting Expedited 
Discovery and Other Relief, SEC v. Telegram Inc., No. 1:19-cv-09439-PKC (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 
2019).  
 123. Brief of TON Community Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants Telegram 
Group Inc. & Ton Issuer Inc., No. 1:19-cv-09439-PKC (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2020), at 8 [hereinafter 
TON Foundation Brief] (“[T]he TON Blockchain is just a back-end distributed computing device 
that executes numerous programs performing arbitrary computations . . . Grams as well as other 
Currencies are managed in TON as the so-called Currency Collections.  But all Grams will be 
located in smart contracts so in a way TON is the smart contract platform more than a 
cryptocurrency one.”). 
 124. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. 
 125. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901 et seq. 
 126.  Defendant’s Memorandum of Law (1) In Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment 
and (2) in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Application for a Preliminary Injunction, SEC v. Telegram, Inc., 
No. 1:19-cv-09439-PKC (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2020), at 39 [hereinafter Jan. 15 Memorandum]. 
 127. Defendants’ Answer, Defenses, and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff’s Complaint, No. 
1:19-cv-09439-PKC (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2019), ¶¶ 3, 46, 50, 51, 52; Brief for Defendants-
Appellants, SEC v. Telegram Group, Inc., No. 20-1076 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2020), at 11 [hereinafter 
Appellants’ Brief] (describing Grams). 
 128. Order to Show Cause, Temporary Restraining Order, and Order Granting Expedited 
Discovery, and Other Relief, SEC v. Telegram Inc., No. 1:19-cv-09439-PKC (S.D.N.Y Oct. 11, 
2019). 
  
2020]   A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL-ASSET SECURITIES 189 
vigorously disputed that the Grams, as opposed to the GPAs, were 
securities.129  At the end of March 2020, after hearing argument on the 
parties’ motions, the District Court granted the SEC’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction.130   
The court agreed with the SEC’s view that the whole transaction, i.e., 
both the sale of the GPAs and the future distribution of Grams, was a single 
offering.131  The court stated that the Initial Investors in the GPAs were 
underwriters in the public offering of the Grams.132  The Grams were deemed 
financial instruments—securities133—that would “come to rest” in the hands 
of the public, and their resales would represent “an integral part of the sale of 
securities without a required registration statement.”134  The court stated that 
the “case present[ed] a ‘scheme’ to be evaluated under Howey that consists 
of the full set of contracts, expectations, and understandings centered on the 
sales and distribution of the Gram.”135   
2.  Distribution, Grams & “Scheme” 
The economic nature of transactions, including the parties’ objective 
expectations, “must be examined as of the time that the transaction took 
place.”136  Looking at the “scheme” to distribute the Grams at the time of the 
sale of the GPAs to the Initial Investors, the District Court emphasized that 
Telegram admittedly had not filed a registration statement for the offering of 
either “the Gram Purchase Agreements or Grams.”137  Although the 
statement was written in the disjunctive, the court applied the Howey analysis 
mainly to the Initial Purchasers and the GPAs, not the future Gram-holders 
and Grams.138  In short, the court addressed the transactions at issue only from 
the perspective of the Initial Investors under Howey. 139   
 
 129. Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Emergency Application for Preliminary 
Injunction at 1–2, SEC v. Telegram Inc., No. 1:19-cv-09439-PKC (S.D.N.Y Oct. 16, 2019).  
 130. Court Order, supra note 10. 
 131. Id. at *27. 
 132. Id. at *62–64. 
 133. See also Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission’s Memorandum of Law in Support 
of its Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, SEC v. Telegram Inc. & Ton Issuer Inc., No. 1:19-cv-
09439-PKC (S.D.N.Y Jan. 15, 2020) [hereinafter SEC Memorandum] (“Grams will remain 
investment contracts upon delivery.”). 
 134. Court Order, supra note 10, at *4, *61. 
 135. Id. at *60.  
 136. SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Products Corp., 524 F. Supp. 866, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (subsequent 
events may only to a limited degree “give rise to inferences that are relevant to the economic reality 
of the transactions at the time they occurred”).  
 137. Court Order, supra note 10, at *61 (emphasis added). 
 138. Id. at *26–27. 
 139. Id. (“The economic reality of Telegram’s course of conduct is straightforward and rather 
easily understood.  Telegram entered into agreements and understandings with the Initial Purchasers 
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This syncopated approach ignores some crucial economic realities of 
this case.  A “distribution” is synonymous with a public offering of 
securities140 and covers “‘the entire process by which in the course of a public 
offering the block of securities is dispersed and ultimately comes to rest in 
the hands of the investing public.’”141  Persons who distribute the securities 
are underwriters.  The statute defines an “underwriter” in connection with 
distribution of “any security.”142  So does case law, including the cases cited 
by the District Court.143   
This suggests the following conclusions.  The underwriters (i.e., the 
private investors who have entered into the GPAs allegedly to distribute 
Grams to the public)144 must ultimately distribute unregistered securities to 
public investors.145  It is these public investors who are presumed unable to 
“fend for themselves”146 and in need of the securities law disclosure and 
liability rules.147  Such public investors would be the future, post-launch 
 
who provided upfront capital in exchange for the future delivery of a discounted asset, Grams, 
which, upon receipt (and the expiration of the lockup periods for Round One Purchasers), would be 
resold in a public market with the expectation that the Initial Purchasers would earn a profit.  A 
reasonable Initial Purchaser understands and expects that they will only profit if the reputation, skill, 
and involvement of Telegram and its founders remain behind the enterprise, including through the 
sale of Grams from the Initial Purchasers into the public market. The Gram Purchase Agreements 
and the future delivery and resale of Grams are viewed in their totality for the purpose of 
the Howey analysis”).  
 140. Id. at *23–24 (citing Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1959); 
Berckeley Inv. Grp. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 215 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 141. Id. at *24 (citing R. A. Holman v. SEC, 366 F.2d 446, 449 (2d Cir. 1966)) (emphasis added). 
 142. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11). 
 143. See, e.g., Gilligan, 267 F.2d at 468 (in a case involving debentures, the court agreed that 
“the intention to retain the debentures only if Crowell-Collier continued to operate profitably was 
equivalent to a ‘purchased . . . with a view to . . . distribution’ within the statutory definition of 
underwriters in § 2(11).  To hold otherwise would be to permit a dealer who speculatively purchases 
an unregistered security in the hope that the financially weak issuer had, as is stipulated here, ‘turned 
the corner,’ to unload on the unadvised public what he later determines to be an unsound investment 
without the disclosure sought by the securities laws, although it is in precisely such circumstances 
that disclosure is most necessary and desirable.”) (emphasis added); Geiger v. SEC, 363 F.3d 481, 
487–88 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (concerning shares); Wyo. St. Treasurer v. Moody’s Inv’rs Serv. (In re 
Lehman Bros. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig.), 650 F.3d 167, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[T]o qualify as an 
underwriter under the participation prongs of the statutory definition, a person must participate, 
directly or indirectly, in purchasing securities from an issuer with a view to distribution, in offering 
or selling securities for an issuer in connection with a distribution, or in the underwriting of such an 
offering.”) (emphasis added). 
 144. SEC Memorandum, supra note 133, at 28 (“Telegram’s offers and sales were but an 
intermediary step towards its ultimate, indisputable goal—the worldwide distribution of 
Grams . . . .”). 
 145. Court Order, supra note 10, at *41, *66–67.  Indeed, the court cited Geiger, 363 F.3d at 
487–88, which applied to shares.  Id. at *64. 
 146. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (“An offering to those who are shown 
to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction ‘not involving any public offering.’”). 
 147. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 125; SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l. Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 
1085–86 (9th Cir. 2010) (“When a company fails entirely to register its securities and nonetheless 
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Gram-holders because the contractual language of the GPAs (which were  
unregistered investment contracts) restricted GPA resales, assignments or 
other disposition.148  The Initial Investors effectively could resell only the 
Grams and only after the launch of the TON Blockchain.149 
As the SEC correctly pointed out in its motion, the transactional 
structure, timing, and “the economic inducements of the transaction [assist 
courts in determining] whether the security was intended to ‘come to rest’ 
with a private purchaser or, in reality, with public investors at large.”150  
Consequently, it is imperative to inquire into the nature of the financial assets 
that would be distributed to and come to rest in the hands of public investors.  
Furthermore, the economic realities and expectations of all parties involved, 
not just the Initial Investors and Telegram at the time when they entered into 
the investment agreements, must be examined.   
3. The Two-Stage Process 
This Section studies the facts and economic realities of the Telegram 
transaction through the lens of a hypothetical.  Imagine that Telegram is 
Goldgram, a wealthy gold-mining company.  It wants to mine more gold and 
mint beautiful coins.  To finance building the mine, Goldgram seeks capital 
from wealthy accredited investors.151  These “Initial Investors” will be 
compensated with the newly minted gold coins,152 perhaps with a rare picture 
of the most respected President of the United States.  Goldgram also promises 
the Initial Investors that large swaths of the public would love to have these 
coins and would like nothing better than to use these coins to purchase sundry 
services and goods on the market or to power their own applications and 
business ventures.153   
Goldgram states that the coins will be distributed and circulate on a 
decentralized open source platform on which all participants, including 
Goldgram, can build, and that Goldgram will not control.154  Goldgram 
 
proceeds to sell them generally to the public, however, the entire system of mandatory public 
disclosure is evaded to public detriment.”); SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“Registration exemptions are construed strictly to promote full disclosure of information for the 
protection of the investing public.”). 
 148. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 127, at 15; Jan. 15 Memorandum, supra note 126, at 7–8, 15–
16, 43–45.   
 149. Court Order, supra note 10, at *3; Jan. 15 Memorandum, supra note 126, at 15–16. 
 150. SEC Memorandum, supra note 133, at 30 (emphasis added). 
 151. Jan. 15 Memorandum, supra note 126, at 7, 11–12, 46.  
 152. Id. at 4 (“Grams will not entitle purchasers to any income, any dividends, or any interests 
in Telegram (or any other entity), nor do they resemble stock or any other form of equity.”). 
 153. Id. at 10–11, 15, 27. 
 154. Id. at 11, 17; Appellants’ Brief, supra note 127, at 11.  In open-source blockchain protocols, 
developers are no longer running the show because updates and changes to the protocol are approved 
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already has a useful membership services platform that can help popularize 
the coins—“Messenger.”155  It also initially promises to employ Messenger 
and to add a digital wallet in order to help future public users receive, use, 
and sell the coins more efficiently.156   
Once the Initial Investor receives their return on investment in the form 
of the coins, what could they do with them?  The Initial Investor could 
exchange them for Bitcoin or U.S. dollars, hold them for speculative 
purposes, buy a fashionable asset with it, build a Dapp, access a private golf 
club, or do whatever else money can buy.157  Naturally, the newly minted 
coins would be more valuable to them because Goldgram had already 
established Messenger, which could be used as a mechanism to promote the 
coins.  The Initial Investor knows that a high level of public attention is 
associated with better returns in this market,158 and that the value of money 
and assets similar to these gold coins depends on their use and the network 
effect.159   
They want Goldgram to continuously improve the quality of its 
distribution network,160 particularly in case they are reluctant to sell or use 
their coins right away and would like to hold them for speculative or 
investment purposes.161  That is why our Initial Investor is glad that 
 
by the community, and changes depend on full nodes operators.  See Reyes, (Un)Corporate Crypto-
Governance, supra note 19, at 1913–1914. 
 155. Jan. 15 Memorandum, supra note 126, at 9–10. 
 156. SEC Memorandum, supra note 133, at 6–8.  
 157. Jan. 15 Memorandum, supra note 126, at 26–27; TON Foundation Brief, supra note 123, 
at 23–24 (listing the services and tools developers have created for the TON Blockchain); Reyes, 
(Un)Corporate Crypto-Governance, supra note 19, at 1902 (“[W]hen cryptocurrency owners 
purchase cryptocurrency, some do so for the purpose of making an investment in the protocol for 
which they will receive a proportionate measure of profit or loss.  But not all cryptocurrency holders 
purchase cryptocurrency for such speculative investment purposes.”). 
 158. Yukun Liu & Aleh Tsyvinski, Risks and Returns of Cryptocurrency 23–27 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24877, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24877.pdf. 
 159. See, e.g., SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. 2013); 
Cong et al., supra note 120, at 10–11; see also Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal & Vadhindran Rao, 
Stable Cryptocurrencies: First Order Principles, 3 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 62, 75 (2020) 
(“A cryptocurrency would have intrinsic worth if there are genuine economic transactions that are 
reliably being performed with its tokens . . . .”). 
 160. Jan. 15 Memorandum, supra note 126, at 18–19 (discussing the role of the TON Foundation 
and Telegram’s services). 
 161. For a similar scenario, see SEC v. Belmont Reid & Co., Inc., 794 F.2d 1388, 1391 (9th Cir. 
1986) (“The difficulty we have with this analysis is its ready applicability to any sale-of-goods 
contract in which the buyer pays in advance of delivery and the ability of the seller to perform is 
dependent, in part, on both his managerial skill and some good fortune . . . As we view it, the 
prepayment plan purchasers in this case had as their primary purpose to profit from the anticipated 
increase in the world price of gold . . . To the extent the purchasers relied on the managerial skill of 
CMC they did so as an ordinary buyer, having advanced the purchase price, relies on an ordinary 
seller.  We therefore agree with the district court that ‘[p]rofits to the coin buyer depended upon the 
fluctuations of the gold market, not the managerial efforts of CMC . . . .’”) (citations omitted). 
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Goldgram’s shareholders and developers have promised to keep some coins 
for themselves, have signed a lockup agreement, and will have the right to 
sell the coins only several years later.162  This way, the Initial Investor is 
certain that Goldgram’s economic interests will be aligned with theirs.  
Having Goldgram as a fellow coin-holder will ensure Goldgram’s incentives 
to continue improving the platform, even though third parties can also do that 
in a decentralized open source system.  The benefits of making the system 
more efficient will inure to everyone: the Initial Investors, Goldgram, and the 
public.   
Since the coins are traded in public markets as a commodity, their prices 
will depend on the law of supply and demand, as well as, in certain cases, a 
predetermined formula.163  The higher the demand, the higher the price of the 
commodity.  A better demand increases the differential between the Initial 
Investor’s investment costs and the coins’ market price.  This difference is 
their sole return on investment.  Indeed, they will not get any other payments 
from Goldgram.164  All they worry about is coin appreciation.   
In contrast to the Initial Investor, the subsequent coin-purchasers are not 
party to the Initial Investor’s arrangement with Goldgram.  Rather, the 
subsequent coin-purchasers are motivated by the simplicity and cost-
efficiency of transacting with these fancy coins and using them primarily as 
a currency.165  They also understand that the platform on which the coins 
trade is decentralized and open source,166 which means that Goldgram does 
not have “superior rights” or exercise control over coin circulation, supply, 
demand, and valuation.167   
From the perspective of the subsequent coin-holders, what Goldgram 
originally promised to the Initial Purchasers is irrelevant. These arguments 
unequivocally demonstrate what the investment contract is in this scenario.  
It is only the first part involving capital raising.  Who is the investor?  Only 
the Initial Investor as a capital provider.  
4.  Contract Interpretation and Bond Maturity 
The District Court in Telegram seems to have missed that the two 
classes of asset purchasers—the Initial Investors and the Subsequent Token-
Holders—could coexist in the post-launch environment and that their 
 
 162. Court Order, supra note 10, at *12–17; Appellants’ Brief, supra note 127, at 14–18. 
 163. McKeon Report, supra note 120, at 8–9, 11 (discussing “the Reference Price” mechanism 
and other experts’ opinions).   
 164. Jan. 15 Memorandum, supra note 126, at 4, 13. 
 165. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 127, at 39–41, 45. 
 166. Id. at 16. 
 167. Id. at 11. 
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expectations concerning the assets and the issuer-developer could diverge.  
Instead, the court focused primarily on the Initial Investors alone.  
For instance, it spent considerable time demonstrating that the Initial 
Investors had an investment intent and that they expected the issuer to ensure 
their return on investment.168  It is hard to question that they did: the Initial 
Investors must have believed that the GPAs, which did not give the right to 
any explicit coupon payments or dividends,169 would be more valuable than 
the cost of purchasing the right to receive the coins under the GPAs.  
Otherwise, they would not have entered into these investment agreements.   
These sophisticated and wealthy investors had agreed to absorb the 
significant downside risk when they entered into the GPAs.170  They 
purchased debt instruments with an uncertain repayment in the form of future 
coins that might or might not be worth something on delivery and hopefully 
would appreciate in value at some point after their delivery.171  Such broad 
reading of profit is supported by Supreme Court precedent.172   
It does not matter whether the Initial Investors planned on using the 
coins for consumptive purposes later on:173 the more valuable the assets are 
in the hands of their holder, the more the holder can get for their money.  The 
critical factual inquiry, instead, is whether the Initial Investors had a 
reasonable expectation that Telegram would continue to work on improving 
the value of the coin ecosystem.174  
This expectation is premised on the interpretation of the contractual 
language of the GPAs and Telegram’s promises.  Did Telegram have this 
contractual obligation or did it effectively disclaim in the offering materials 
 
 168. Court Order, supra note 10, at *26–27, *36–47.   
 169. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 127, at 20, 50. 
 170. Court Order, supra note 10, at *46; Jan. 15 Memorandum, supra note 126, at 5, 15; McKeon 
Report, supra note 126, at 6–7. 
 171. The Initial Purchasers would receive their money back less Telegram’s expenses if the 
issuer was unable to develop TON blockchain and Grams.  Court Order, supra note 10, at *34.  The 
court also cites subjective views of investors.  Id. at *44–46. 
 172. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394 (2004) (“[W]hen we held that ‘profits’ must ‘come 
solely from the efforts of others,’ we were speaking of the profits that investors seek on their 
investment, not the profits of the scheme in which they invest.  We used ‘profits’ in the sense of 
income or return, to include, for example, dividends, other periodic payments, or the increased value 
of the investment.”); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852–853 (1975). 
 173. See Court Order, supra note 10, at *36–37 (discussing investor intent); Jan. 15 
Memorandum, supra note 126, at 26 (claiming consumptive purposes of Grams); McKeon Report, 
supra note 126, at 4, 6, 12–14 (discussing SEC expert reports); Appellants’ Brief, supra note 127, 
at 39–41 (underscoring that Grams were designed to have consumptive utility). 
 174. See, e.g., Edwards, 540 U.S. at 395 (“We identified the ‘touchstone’ of an investment 
contract as ‘“the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable 
expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of 
others. . .’ . . . .” (quoting Forman, 421 U.S. at 852)); THE SEC FRAMEWORK, supra note 3, at 2–
10 (describing the factors that bear on the analysis of the “efforts of others” prong). 
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(and/or after the offering) any responsibility for post-launch and post-
delivery services?175  Howey demands an “objective inquiry into the character 
of the instrument or transaction offered based on what the purchasers were 
‘led to expect.’”176  In other words, the central question of fact is whether the 
contractual language of the investment agreements extended Telegram’s 
obligations beyond the delivery date.177   
What was the term of the GPAs? 178  Maturity of bonds is generally 
included in offering materials.  The resultant expectation is that the issuer 
would generate interest payments (coupon) until the bondholder received the 
final payment consisting of a coupon and principal on the bond. This standard 
timeline, however, does not reflect the terms of the transaction at issue.179 
Instead, one can infer the following important assumption from the court 
decision itself: the District Court essentially presumed some implied maturity 
that depended on when the expectation of support and promotion by the issuer 
ceased to exist in the minds of the bond purchasers.   
This assumption indeed has merit.  If the “bonds” did not have an 
express maturity date tied to the coin delivery date, the investment term could 
be until well after the launch of the TON Blockchain.180  The expected return 
would remain contingent and dependent on the continuous efforts of 
Telegram.  Such a broad post-delivery reading of the contract performance 
term comports with the longstanding precedent on investors’ pre- and post-
purchase dependence on entrepreneurs.181   
In Telegram, at least two events and contractual terms could assist in 
determining the maturity of the GPAs.  One is the completion of the initially 
 
 175. Court Order, supra note 10, at *5, *16, *56.  Cf. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 127, at 16, 
42 (discussing Telegram’s promises and actions, as well as pertinent case law on issuer promises); 
Jan. 15 Memorandum, supra note 126, at 14, 17, 20, 26, 28–29; McKeon Report, supra note 126, 
at 13–14 (discussing an SEC expert report and emphasizing that third-party developers would act 
for their own benefit, independently of Telegram). 
 176. Warfield v. Alaniz, 569 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 177. Court Order, supra note 10, at *5 (observing that “Telegram, as a matter of fact rather than 
legal obligation, will be the guiding force behind the TON Blockchain for the immediate post-
launch period….”). Cf. Jan. 15 Memorandum, supra note 126, at 14 (citing offering documents 
stating to the contrary and Telegram’s statements to investors). 
 178. This timing also factors into the Howey test’s common enterprise analysis that the court 
applied under the horizontal and strict vertical commonality criteria.  If the GPA investors were 
bondholders under the proposed framework, and the term to maturity extended beyond the delivery 
and launch date, the post-delivery commonality entails naturally.  Court Order, supra note 10, at 
*31–36.  See, e.g., Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87–88 (2d Cir. 1994) (summarizing case 
law on horizontal and vertical commonality). 
 179. The District Court in Telegram correctly rejected it. Court Order, supra note 10, at *28–39. 
 180. Compare SEC Memorandum, supra note 133, at *8–9 with Appellants’ Brief, supra note 
127, at 13, 16. 
 181. See Living Benefits Asset Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Kestrel Aircraft Co. (In re Living Benefits Asset 
Mgmt., L.L.C.), 916 F.3d 528 , 537–39 (5th Cir. 2019) (summarizing 14 years of case law on the 
matter). 
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promised (but later disclaimed) integration of Telegram’s Messenger and a 
wallet (“TON Wallet”) to be developed by Telegram to facilitate Gram 
circulation.182  The other is the expiration of the lockup agreements with the 
firm’s shareholders and the developers.183  Both were post-launch and post-
delivery events. 
A third and perhaps less cogent timing option is the transfer of the 
remaining Grams to third parties— including an independent foundation 
entrusted with limited central-bank-like and advisory tasks184—as well as an 
incentive program targeting the users of Messenger and motivating them to 
use the coins and interact with the TON Blockchain.185  Although either of 
these events could impact the supply and valuation of Grams, the offering 
materials purported to take this additional supply out of Telegram’s hands.186  
If Telegram had no decision-making power over future token distributions, 
these terms would not factor in Telegram’s obligations to the Initial 
Purchasers.   
To summarize, the first two options (scilicet, issuer representations and 
the lockup agreements) are relevant benchmarks pegging bond maturity to 
contract performance.  It is plausible that the investment contract created the 
expectations in the minds of the Initial Investors that Telegram would 
continue to contribute to the improvement of the TON Blockchain’s 
ecosystem and Gram valuation.  The obligations of Telegram to the Initial 
Investors could have survived the token delivery and platform launch dates.  
Using the court’s reference to the “Bahamas test,” the Initial Investors would 
have been harmed if the issuer’s management decamped to the Bahamas187 
until one of these two events had come to pass.  
Note, however, that this conclusion has no bearing on the Subsequent 
Purchasers’ expectations and uses of Grams.  Telegram admitted that it had 
 
 182. SEC Memorandum, supra note 133 at *7; Court Order, supra note 10, at *53–58. 
 183. Court Order, supra note 10, at *13–14, *57. 
 184. Court Order, supra note 10, at *16-17, *39–40; cf. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 127, at 
17–18, 52.  Based on the evidence on record, these provisions in the offering materials are not 
necessarily applicable to the maturity analysis.  For one, these extra coins would be priced according 
to a preset formula reflecting market supply and volatility.  Court Order, supra note 10, at *10–11; 
McKeon Report, supra note 126, at 8; Appellants’ Brief, supra note 127, at 18 n.2.  The issuer 
proposed to set up an independent non-profit foundation to enable this central-bank-like function. 
Court Order, supra note 10, at *16.  About a third of the total supply of the coins would be assigned 
for this purpose.  These coins would not be used for voting or staking purposes in validating 
transactions and, if the non-profit was never established, could be permanently locked up. 
Appellants’ Brief, supra note 127, at 17–18, 52.  Consequently, this extra cache of coins would lay 
dormant except instances of market volatility harmful to all market participants, including Initial 
and Subsequent Token-Holders.   
 185. Court Order, supra note 10, at *53–54. 
 186. Id.  For example, Messenger users would receive the coins primarily on “a first-come, first-
served basis.”  Id. at 53. 
 187. Henderson & Raskin, supra note 109. 
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sold securities to the Initial Investors to finance the TON Blockchain 
project.188  Howey applied to the GPAs at the time of sale.189  The term “sale” 
means that the parties incurred an obligation to sell securities for value.190  
This is when the parties’ expectations are determined.191  Consequently, to 
the extent that the maturity of the bonds was unclear, there was merely a 
question of fact concerning when the securities at issue would expire.  This 
question is irrelevant to the inquiry what the Subsequent Token-Holders who 
were not party to the GPAs expected from Grams, the TON Blockchain, and 
its developer.  
Nothing in the record or the text of the decision seems to suggest that 
the bonds and tokens, as well as the two classes of asset purchasers could not 
exist concurrently after the launch.  To the extent that there were issues of 
fact concerning whether a reasonable investor192 would have a reasonable 
expectation193 at the time of the investment agreements about the timing of 
the completion of Telegram’s essential managerial efforts, it did not 
necessarily extend the application of Howey to the Grams sold to Subsequent 
Purchasers.  
Instead, the facts in Telegram explicate the two-stage process: the 
issuer-developer offers debt-like instruments giving their holders a right to 
receive some digital assets which represent the implicit coupon of uncertain 
value and the principal.  The assets’ value on delivery and after the delivery 
depends on how successful the issuer is and will be in developing and 
promoting the underlying project.  The rest of the market proceed to use the 
assets regardless of the contractually stipulated obligations of the Initial 
Investors and the issuer-developer. 
D.  KIK INTERACTIVE, DAPPS, AND NON-NATIVE TOKENS 
1. Dapps 
Let us examine the two-stage process through another illustration.  In 
crypto, many products and services are a code that creates Dapps, related 
 
 188. Court Order, supra note 10, at *25–26; Appellants’ Brief, supra note 127, at 29. 
 189. Court Order, supra note 10, at *28–29. 
 190. 15 U.S.C. §77b(a)(3).   
 191. SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Products Corp., 524 F. Supp. 866, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 192. The reasonable investor standard is objective. Russian Hill Capital, LP v. Energy Corp. of 
Am., 2016 WL 1029541, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 527 
F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 193. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 395 (2004); Warfield v. Alaniz, 569 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th 
Cir. 2009); Court Order, supra note 10, at *37–38 (“The inquiry is an objective one focusing on the 
promises and offers made to investors; it is not a search for the precise motivation of each individual 
participant.”) (citation omitted). 
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tokens, and platforms on which they circulate.194  To expound the nature of 
Dapps, let us think about a typical web application.  In a regular web 
application, there are two parties: a front-end client and a back-end server, 
which exchange messages on http.  Dapps are similar, except that a 
blockchain performs the functions of a back-end server; i.e., there is not a 
centralized hosting service.  While we, the end-users, may not even notice 
any changes, on the efficiency and security side, the blockchains is arguably 
more secure than centralized servers mainly because it is hard to take down 
a whole network and all its nodes or to change personal and transaction 
information when it is distributed, meaning that it is not stored in one single 
place or server.195  
When an entrepreneur needs capital to develop a Dapp, their project fits 
within the two-stage framework, and once a platform and tokens are fully 
developed, the developer may be expected to surrender their governance 
rights and step aside. Take the February 2019 cease-and-desist order 
concerning Gladius Network LLC.196  Gladius was developing a network, a 
marketplace of sorts, whose participants “could rent spare bandwidth and 
storage space on their computers and servers to others for use in defense 
against certain types of cyberattacks and to enhance their content delivery 
speed.”197 The idea that, instead of using Dropbox’s or Google Drive’s 
network, participants would share their disk space is not new and reminds of 
other projects for decentralized storages, such as Ethereum’s Swarm.198  
Gladius, similarly, proposed renting extra bandwidth and storage space to 
others.   
Gladius issued tokens to be used as payment for these services.  The 
tokens could be purchased either from Gladius itself or on secondary markets.  
As is often the case with ICOs, Gladius first sought funds to develop the 
tokens and the network before they could become fully functional and 
independent.199  The ultimate system at Stage Two was designed as 
autonomous and decentralized:   
The network was designed so that once it was operational, content 
providers would be able to organize and manage their own pools 
of nodes [, i.e., groups organizing and negotiating the transactional 
 
 194. See, e.g., Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 5, at 383, 387, 411 (discussing definitions and the 
application of business trusts to DLT). 
 195. In addition, backing up data is necessary in a centralized system, while blockchain is ab 
initio built on redundancies, the data will “survive” somewhere, on multiple nodes within the 
blockchain. 
 196. The following discussion is based on Guseva, Game Theory, supra note 7. 
 197. Gladius Order, supra note 64, at 1. 
 198. SWARM, https://swarm.ethereum.org/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2020). 
 199. Gladius Order, supra note 64, at 3 (“[T]he funds raised would go towards “completing” the 
development of the network . . . .” and marketing). 
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details, such as bandwidth, etc., on the network], and Gladius itself 
would not have to participate in negotiations or transactions 
between content providers, pool managers, or nodes.200   
From a purely transactional perspective, Gladius sold an instrument 
providing access to a marketplace where commodities would be exchanged 
for commodities or services in cashless transactions.  The developer offered 
owners of spare storage space and bandwidth an opportunity to rent their 
spare capacity to others.  By way of analogy, this was just like Airbnb 
participants offering their apartments for rent to others.  As Friedrich Engels 
observed in his Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, private 
property in products leads to exchanges transforming all products into 
commodities.201 This particular Dapp was an example of this economic 
transformation.  
Gladius’ offering documents represented that the proceeds from the 
offering would cover mostly R&D and promotional expenses during Stage 
One.202  The offering materials also included a contractual provision whereby 
“purchasers . . . warrant[ed] that ownership of . . . [tokens] granted access to 
the Gladius Network, but conferred no equity or other rights (including 
ownership rights) as to Gladius.”203  The tokens served as a form of return on 
investments, and participants could help Gladius promote the network and 
thus earn more tokens to use on the network.204   
The transactions in Gladius can be simplified as the whitepaper-
indentures offering bonds with an uncertain stream of income.  These were 
highly risky zero-coupon bonds.  The return in the form of new tokens 
depended on the success of the efforts of the developers and, to a lesser 
extent, on the promotion activity of the token-holders.  In later project stages, 
the developers would take a back seat and let token circulation and use 
determine valuation.   
Gladius promised that in Stage Two, once it had created and marketed 
their products, which essentially included the tokens and the underlying 
platforms, it would not have any governance role.  Within the parameters of 
the code-based governance, platform participants would determine the details 
and terms of their peer-to-peer transactions. These token-holders would not 
be security holders.    
 
 200. Id. at 2. 
 201. FRIEDRICH ENGELS, ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE STATE 87 
(1884).  Id. at 62 (“The rise of private property in herds and articles of luxury led to exchange 
between individuals, to the transformation of products into commodities . . . .”).  
 202. Gladius Order, supra note 64, at 4. 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id. at 4 (“Gladius promoted a bounty program . . . .”). 
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2. The Case of Kik Interactive: Blurring the Boundaries of the Two-
Stage Token Distribution  
It is vital for digital asset entrepreneurs and investors to understand 
when Stage One segues into Stage Two. This determination establishes which 
parties are security holders and, consequently, may bring claims against the 
issuer under securities law. By the same token, factfinders need this 
information to establish who the security holders (i.e., bondholders) are and 
when their expectations, as well as the related obligations and liability of the 
issuer, cease to exist.   
An important elucidative example of the two-stage process is the 
September 2020 Kik Interactive decision.205  This first, and for this reason 
momentous, precedent examines a similar two-stage structure and 
underscores the need for a doctrinal analysis of the contractual expectations 
of investors and issuers.  The facts were similar to the previously discussed 
cases: Kik planned to build a cryptocurrency on Ethereum, i.e., the firm built 
non-native digital assets and applications on the Ethereum blockchain.  The 
issuer projected that the assets, called “Kin,” would offer interoperability and 
be used, inter alia, to buy and sell digital products across various 
applications.206  
The fact patterns in the two Southern District of New York cases—
Telegram and Kik—share some similarities but also differ in several respects.  
Kins were first sold via a private sale that was structured in a way similar to 
the bond-like instruments sold in Telegram.207  Then, Kik almost 
immediately proceeded with a public distribution of its assets to the putative 
users of Kin.  This public sale took place one day after the private sale and 
before the applications and ecosystem for Kin were sufficiently developed.208  
In contrast to Kik, Telegram planned to wait until its blockchain was ready 
for launch and token distribution.  In this sense, Telegram bears a clear 
imprint of the two-stage process. 
The timing inconsistencies, however, do not undermine the application 
of the two-stage template to Kik.  The facts in Kik merely suggests that both 
the private placements of Kik’s quasi-bonds and the public distribution of 
Kins took place during Stage One, i.e., during the asset development stage.  
In fact, both transactions were one.  Judge Hellerstein of the Southern District 
of New York quite easily connected and integrated the sales as “part of a 
 
 205. SEC v. Kik Interactive, No. 19 Civ. 5244 (AKH), 2020 WL 5819770 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).  
 206. Id. at *1–2. 
 207. Id. at *2. 
 208. At the time of the offering and distribution of Kin, “no goods or services were available for 
sale to holders of Kin.”  Id. at *3.  “[N]one of this ‘consumptive use’ was available at the time of 
the distribution.  It would materialize only if the enterprise advertised by Kik turned out to be 
successful.”).  Id. at * 7. 
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single plan of financing . . . made for the same general purpose.  Proceeds 
from both sales went toward funding Kik’s operations and building the 
ecosystem for Kin.”209 
The District Court examined the integration doctrine to support its 
conclusion that the private placement exemption was inapplicable.210  The 
analysis, however, should not stop there because integration is conceptually 
relevant to the contractual obligations of Kik to the purchasers of Kin and to 
the expectations of the Kin purchasers.  Collapsing the private placement into 
the public offering effectively implies that the contractual obligations of Kik 
from the private placement memoranda bear on the issuer’s obligations and 
the respective expectations of the public purchasers of Kin.  Both categories 
of purchasers expected Kik to carry on as the locus of project development 
for the Kin ecosystem that was crucial to the value of Kins.  This 
understanding of integration from the position of investor expectations 
comports with the language of Howey that states that investors should expect 
profits from the actions of a third party.211  Both parties, the private and the 
public purchasers, were the Initial Investors participating in Stage One.  
Stage Two in Kik would mean that Kik’s obligations to all purchasers, 
including private and public sales, would no longer have valid contractual 
expectations that Kins, a cryptocurrency, would be supported by Kik and 
derive value from Kik’s efforts.  The quasi-bonds issued by Kik would thus 
expire.   
E.  THE SPECIAL CASE OF EQUITY 
So far, our discussion has focused on the financial instruments that are 
not equity.  Some digital assets, however, do have equity-like characteristics.  
The two-stage process that schematizes bond offerings is not fully applicable 
to equity.  Therefore, the objective of this Section is not to provide an ultimate 
framework for crypto-equity but to raise questions about the transition of 
equity securities to partnership-like interests depending on the level of 
project decentralization.  
I have already briefly discussed “governance tokens” in the Token 
Taxonomy Section.212  This Section sketches the contours of a pertinent 
example of equity in DAOs.  By definition, a code-based decentralized 
“organization” seems to be the first candidate to trigger either securities law 
 
 209. Id. at *8.  
 210. Id. 
 211. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299–300 (1946) (observing that investors are “led 
to expect profits” from a promoter or a third party and that “[a] common enterprise managed by 
respondents or third parties with adequate personnel and equipment is therefore essential if the 
investors are to achieve their paramount aim of a return on their investments.”). 
 212. See supra Section B. 
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or corporate law analysis.213  DAOs are quasi-organizations governed by 
smart contracts, self-enforcing protocols through majority consensus, i.e., 
confirmations of transactions and related decisions from parties on a 
network.214   
The two-stage process and the nature of the securities involved here are 
different from those in ICOs like the Telegram case.  First, DAO-token-
holders are similar to equity-holders.  These “equity-holders” vote on all 
projects within the parameters set forth by the underlying code.  In this sense, 
DAOs differ from more traditional business organizations because no 
intermediaries such as executives or boards of directors are required.  This is 
an example of direct equity-holder democracy where DAOs embody the 
ultimate corporate contract: DAOs automatize the main question facing 
entrepreneurs (and investors), which is making believable promises 
accompanied by their automatic enforcement.215  Equity interests in DAOs 
may also be substantively analogous to those in partnerships.216  
Second, DAOs’ capital raising and origination often follow the 
templates of traditional business organizations: there are the initial promoters 
who are supposed to cede governance authority to equity-holders as the 
project matures.217  Once a DAO is deployed, its transactions should be 
transparent (and stored on blockchain), and the initial developer must not be 
able to censor the system.218  In some cases, however, the original developer 
can in the interim retain certain support functions before the project becomes 
fully decentralized.219 
The developer of the underlying source code may be an entity registered 
with or incorporated in one of the U.S. states or in a foreign jurisdiction, while 
the ultimate product of its efforts is, at least in theory, independent and 
decentralized.  Put differently, the developer may be a firm with a locus of 
corporate authority, whereas the DAO does not need one.  From a business 
 
 213. The concept of decentralization is not uniform.  For example, there are “decentralized 
organizations,” in which humans interact via code-based protocols on blockchain, and autonomous 
code-based organizations.  See Vitalik Buterin, supra note 51; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, 
Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887, 889–90, 898–901 (2018) (discussing entities based 
on algorithms and not requiring conventional human intervention). 
 214. For definitions, benefits, and descriptions, see Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 5, at n.22; 
Adam J. Kolber, Not-So-Smart Blockchain Contracts and Artificial Responsibility, 21 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 198, 210–11 (2018); Rodrigues, supra note 9, at 680, 699–702.  
 215. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1416, 1420–21 (1989); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, 36 (1991). 
 216. Partnership is “[a] voluntary association of two or more persons who jointly own and carry 
on a business for profit.”  Partnership, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 217. See infra Section E.1–2. 
 218. See, e.g., Ethereum Whitepaper, supra note 49. 
 219. See infra Section E.2.  
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organizations law’s perspective, a DAO may be unregistered or registered as 
a corporation, an LLC, or any other form of business organization.220  It may 
have features of business trusts, cooperatives, partnerships, and member-
managed LLCs.221   
While in the above-discussed offerings of bonds both the issuer and the 
original investors do not dominate future cryptoassets, their circulation, 
pricing, and platforms, equity-holders in DAOs remain in charge as the 
developer’s role diminishes. Depending on the control investors have over 
the business, an argument can be made that no equity securities are involved 
in the fully decentralized phase.222  Since the purpose of this Section is merely 
to raise questions for future research, let me very briefly set forth two 
scenarios illustrating how DAOs can function and why their equity may not 
be securities.   
1. The DAO 
This is how it can operate.  First, a firm-developer solicits funds in some 
cryptocurrency or fiat currency.  Second, the currency is transferred to 
“systems of smart contracts,” which represent a DAO with its own set of 
code-based governance rules.223  Third, the DAO may, for instance, invest 
the capital in income-generating assets upon approval of the investments by 
token-holders.224  The nature of the assets is irrelevant; they can be digital or 
non-digital, including real estate, diamonds, commodities, and others.  
Fourth, the token-holders receive return from the project.   
The most famous and infamous case of a DAO was “The DAO,” a code 
developed by a German startup. 225  The founders raised capital through the 
 
 220. A related project for DAOs is “LAO.” LAO OPERATING AGREEMENT, 
https://lib.openlaw.io/web/default/template/LAO%20Summoner%20Form%20%F0%9F%91%BE 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2020); The LAO, The LAO: A For-Profit, Limited Liability Autonomous 
Organization, MEDIUM (Sept. 3, 2019), https://medium.com/openlawofficial/the-lao-a-for-profit-
limited-liability-autonomous-organization-9eae89c9669c; see also Reyes, (Un)Corporate Crypto-
Governance, supra note 19, at 1882. 
 221. Reyes, (Un)Corporate Crypto-Governance, supra note 19, at 1882.  
 222. This determination depends, inter alia, on tests like the Williamson test.  Williamson v. 
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 423–24 (5th Cir. 1981).  See also Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 741 (11th 
Cir. 1982) (“An investor who has the ability to control the profitability of his investment, either by 
his own efforts or by majority vote in group ventures, is not dependent upon the managerial skills 
of others.”). 
 223. Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 5, at 387–88, 416–17. 
 224. See, e.g., The DAO Report, supra note 108.  Some promoters (and scammners) also 
advertised that investments would be determined by experts.  Press Release, Litigation Release No. 
24081: SEC v. REcoin Group Foundation (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
litreleases/2018/lr24081.htm.  
 225. Werbach & Cornell, supra note 51, at 350–52; Rodrigues, supra note 9, at 680–82; The 
DAO Report, supra note 108, at 6. 
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sale of The DAO tokens, to be used for investments in other projects.  Profits, 
referred to as “rewards,” would be shared with token-holders.226   
The SEC launched an investigation into The DAO and issued a Section 
21(a) report in July 2017.  It was the first SEC statement emphasizing that 
“the U.S. federal securities law may apply to various activities, including 
[DLT] . . .without regard to the form of the organization or technology used 
to effectuate a particular offer or sale.”227  The threshold inquiry in The DAO 
was the application of the “investment contract” definition under Howey.228   
The SEC showed that The DAO was only partially decentralized 
because, although its token-holders could vote on how to spend the 
contributed capital without involvement of third-party managers or boards of 
directors,229 the developer’s pre-offering and post-offering efforts were 
substantial.  The original developers envisioned that there would be a group 
of sophisticated persons, “curators,” whitelisting investment proposals for 
submission to token-holders for approval.230  They also selected the original 
curators.   
Consequently, once The DAO was deployed, pseudonymous and 
dispersed across many jurisdictions, equity-holders were not well-positioned 
to effectively oppose either the co-founders or the curators.  They, at least 
according to the SEC, depended on the governance decisions and policies 
emanating from one single node of authority—the promoter-firm and/or its 
selected agents.231  This locus of corporate authority, among other Howey 
factors, allowed the SEC to find a security.   
These Howey distinctions, however, are immaterial in the long term: a 
DAO may be completely decentralized if the technology allows.  For 
instance, a code could select “curators” based on preset objective criteria, 
equity-holders holding a certain amount of tokens could propose investment 
projects, or third-party community members could be allowed to put forward 
investment projects.232  Subsequent investment decisions could be reached 
by member consensus, and all profits distributed according to the terms 
embedded in a smart contract without much human intervention.  A relevant 
example would be TheLAO, a venture fund launched in April 2020.233  Any 
 
 226. Werbach & Cornell, supra note 51, at 350–51; The DAO Report, supra note 108, at 5–6, 
16. 
 227. The DAO Report, supra note 108, at 10. 
 228. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).  
 229. The DAO Report, supra note 108, at 7. 
 230. Id. at 14. 
 231. Id. at 14–15.  This conclusion, however, is not uncontroversial.  See, e.g., Rodrigues, supra 
note 9, at 681, 700–702; Randolph A. Robinson II, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the 
Explosion of Initial Coin Offerings, 85 TENN. L. REV. 897, 939–40 (2018). 
 232. See infra Section E(3). 
 233. THELAO, https://www.thelao.io/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2020). 
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Ethereum-based project could submit a proposal that a member of TheLAO 
could thereafter put up to a vote of the members.234   
2. MakerDAO 
Another case in point is MakerDAO, an evolving decentralized 
governance system and an open-source Ethereum project that runs one of the 
largest Dapps on the Ethereum blockchain—the Maker Protocol.235  The two-
stage process in this case is different, and no bond-like financial instruments 
are involved.   
The purpose of the Maker Protocol is to enable users to create and 
acquire the Dai stablecoin that reduces price volatility that plagues Bitcoin.236  
MakerDAO achieves this goal by over-collateralizing Dai by other 
cryptoassets, including Ether and, more recently, USDC, which is a 
centralized stablecoin.237  Users can either generate Dai by depositing 
collateral in a “vault” or purchase Dai on exchanges, such as Coinbase.  
MakerDAO operates as a decentralized and permissionless credit system.  A 
user can also deposit (“lock”) their Dai in the Maker Protocol and earn 
interest on this savings account (“Dai Savings Rate”).238 
The Maker Foundation, a non-profit organization, has built and 
currently runs the Maker Protocol.239  The Foundation interacts with the 
MakerDAO community that helps to govern the project and has announced 
its plan to self-liquidate to transfer the reins to a decentralized governance 
system.  When this happens, the governance of the Maker Protocol will be 
fully in the hands of the holders of MKR—the governance tokens.240   
 
 234. TheLAO, Building a Permissionless Silicon Valley: The LAO Launches on April 28, 
MEDIUM (Apr. 7, 2020) https://medium.com/@thelaoofficial/building-a-permissionless-silicon-
valley-the-lao-launches-on-april-28-25f7837e92c5.  
 235. MakerDAO Whitepaper, supra note 100.  
 236. On the nature, risks, and structure of stablecoins, see, e.g., Marco Dell’Erba, Stablecoins in 
Cryptoeconomics: From Initial Coin Offerings to Central Bank Digital Currencies, 22 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 11–23 (2019); Calcaterra et al., supra note 159, at 63 (“A currency which 
maintains a stable store of value is more efficient for an economy than one which does not”).  See 
also David Yermack, Is Bitcoin a Real Currency? An Economic Appraisal 2, 11–12 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 19747, 2013), https://www.nber.org/papers/w19747.pdf 
(discussing Bitcoin volatility).  
 237. William Foxley, MakerDAO Adds USDC as DeFi Collateral Following ‘Black Thursday’ 
Chaos, YAHOO! FINANCE (Mar. 17, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/makerdao-adds-usdc-
defi-collateral-161036456.html. 
 238. MakerDAO, Whitepaper, supra note 235.  
 239. Id.  In 2019, the Foundation transferred intellectual property, including copyrights and 
trademarks, to a Danish trust; Maker Foundation Transfers Trademarks and IP to Independent 
Foundation, YAHOO! FINANCE (Dec. 31, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/maker-
foundation-transfers-trademarks-ip-185812915.html. 
 240. MakerDAO Whitepaper, supra note 100. 
  
206 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:166 
Today, MKR-holders vote on the types of assets that can be used as 
collateral for the Dai Stablecoin, the savings rate, “oracle feeds” that provide 
information on market prices for the assets used as collateral for the Dai, 
“emergency oracles” that prevent attacks against the governance system, 
upgrades to the system, and risk parameters, among other rights.241  A fully 
decentralized MKR can be analogized either with voting partnership interests 
or LLC members’ equity.242   
One difference between a conventional business organization and 
MakerDAO’s governance is that the proposals are put to a vote not by a 
centralized authority such as a board of directors but by the crypto-
community as well as equity-holders (i.e., MKR-holders).243  To summarize, 
the soon-to-be-liquidated Foundation is a quasi-executive body, MKR-
holders are equity-holders, and Dai-holders are either debtors of the Maker 
Protocol or users with savings accounts.   
The two-stage framework for MakerDAO may be conceptualized as 
follows.  First, the Foundation is a single “firm,” a nexus of contracts.  The 
firm seeks external financing to get its project off the ground, coordinates 
resources, and provides ongoing governance.  Second, the “firm” as such 
dissolves, and the project is fully in the hands of a decentralized self-
governing system.   
It is important to emphasize that decentralization merely shows that the 
original developer is no longer in charge of the project.  It does not mean that 
the DAO is a unique nostrum for all the ills of the traditional business 
organizations.  For instance, like any other organization, whether it is a 
partnership, LLC or corporation, MakerDAO may and does have large 
equity-holders that possess more voting power than smaller equity-holders.244  
 
 241. Id.; see also Vanessa Villanueva Collao & Verity Winship, The New ICO Intermediaries, 
5 ITALIAN L.J. 731, 749 (2019) (“An oracle is a third party (individuals or programs) capable of 
introducing external data into the smart contract.”). 
 242. As of the date of this writing, however, the MKR-holders were not fully in control of the 
DAO, and the Foundation retained limited governance authority. What Will Maker Governance 
Look Like After Complete Decentralization?, MAKER BLOG (Apr. 3, 2020), 
https://blog.makerdao.com/what-will-maker-governance-look-like-after-complete-
decentralization/. 
 243. MakerDAO Whitepaper, supra note 100. 
 244. For instance, the Foundation’s team owns a number of governance tokens.  The Foundation 
also sold more than 5% of the total MKR tokens to two venture capital firms as recently as 
December 2019.  These allegations were made in Complaint, Johnson v. Maker Ecosystem Grp. 
Holdings, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-02569 (N.D. Cal. April 14, 2020), at 14, 
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.358097/gov.uscourts.cand.358097.1.0.pdf 
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capital-partners-and-paradigm/; Andrey Shevchenko, A Crypto Venture Fund Bought the Most Tokens at 
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Voting power concentration may not only compromise decentralized 
decision making but also create clusters of authority allowing some players 
to profit.245  If this happens, minority equity-holders may become vulnerable 
to the majority’s opportunism such as changes in protocol governance or 
approval of proposals favoring the majority.246  
These dynamics do not necessarily bode ill for the future of MakerDAO 
or other decentralized organizations.  Indeed, corporate scholarship is fraught 
with debates that are yet to be settled.  Studies on the alignment of incentives 
of controlling shareholders, private benefits of control, and the quality of 
corporate governance differ in their assessment of the costs and benefits of 
concentrated ownership.247  For instance, controlling equity-holders having a 
long-term commitment to their firms may increase the value of the firms.248  
In addition, governance protocols does not have to be static - they can evolve 
to control for corruption and respond to failure.249  
It is outside the scope of this paper whether DAOs are susceptible to 
voting power concentration among equity-holders or to other maladies of 
business organization ownership and governance.  The purpose of this 
Section is merely to set forth the contours of the two-stage process where the 
original developers promise that they expect to no longer be central to the 
success of their projects and that they would exit and leave equity-holders in 
charge of the business.  
3. The Transformation of Equity and the Williamson Test 
This discussion suggests that there can be at least two scenarios.  In one, 
the promoters are ab initio raising capital by selling partnership interests in a 
fully decentralized venture.  In another, a DAO becomes fully decentralized, 
and possibly partnership-like, some time after its launch and raising capital.  
The promoter should no longer be indispensable to the overall success of the 
business and to the investors’ return on their contributions to the DAO as the 
project segues from a centralized to a decentralized one.  
 
MakerDAO’s Debt Auction, COINTELEGRAPH (Apr. 1, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/a-crypto-
venture-fund-bought-the-most-tokens-at-makerdaos-debt-auction. 
 245. Calcaterra et al., supra note 159, at 71–72 (discussing this scenario in application to 
stablecoins). 
 246. Rodrigues, supra note 9, at 703 (reviewing ways to combat this conflict). 
 247. See, e.g., Ronald Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: 
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1648–50, 1652–53 (2006); 
Albert H. Choi, Concentrated Ownership and Long-Term Shareholder Value, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
53, 63–66 (2018). 
 248. Choi, supra note 247, at 73–75. 
 249. Calcaterra et al., supra note 159, at 81 (observing that constantly changing rules can prevent 
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It is paramount that the developer community and the investors 
understand when Stage Two, i.e., the decentralized stage, begins and what its 
implications are for the equity interests in their ventures, just like they are for 
bond offerings discussed in Sections C and D. Scholarship needs to examine 
how the nature of equity may change with the original equity securities 
disappearing and being replaced with partnership interests.  Although this 
inquiry lies outside the scope of this Article, I would like to point at several 
instructive cases and avenues for research.  
The main relevant precedent is Williamson,250 which is a Fifth Circuit 
case whose approach is adopted in several other circuits.251  The Williamson 
court252 and the courts following Williamson have found that “[a] general 
partnership interest is presumed not to be an investment contract because a 
general partner typically takes an active part in managing the business and 
therefore does not rely solely on the efforts of others.”253  Courts have 
developed a three-prong test to demonstrate when this default presumption 
does not apply, in which case the equity instruments at issue fall under the 
definition of an “investment contract” and are examined under Howey.254  
All three prongs de facto focus on the actual balance of control and the 
way it is distributed between the partners and the promoters.  When the 
balance of power is upset in favor of the promoters, “[a] general partnership 
interest may qualify as an investment contract if the general partner in fact 
retains little ability to control the profitability of the investment”255 and, inter 
alia, remains dependent on the managerial ability of the promoter. This case 
law and the examples discussed in this Article suggest that more research is 
needed in the equity space to establish when a security comes to an end.   
 
 250. In Williamson, the court observed the following: “Although general partners and joint 
venturers may not individually have decisive control over major decisions, they do have the sort of 
influence which generally provides them with access to important information and protection 
against a dependence on others.  Moreover, partnership powers are not in the nature of a nominal 
role in the enterprise which a seller of investment contracts would include in order to avoid the 
securities laws; on the contrary, one would expect such a promoter to insist on ultimate control over 
the investment venture.  An investor who is offered an interest in a general partnership or joint 
venture should be on notice, therefore, that his ownership rights are significant, and that the federal 
securities acts will not protect him from a mere failure to exercise his rights.”  Williamson v. Tucker, 
645 F.2d 404, 422 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 251. See, e.g.,  Koch v. Hankins, 928 F.2d 1471, 1476–78 (9th Cir. 1991); SEC. v. Merchant 
Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 755–58 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 252. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 422-23 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 253. SEC v. Merch. Cap., LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 755 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Williamson, 645 F.2d 
at 422). 
 254. Id. at 755–56. 
 255. Id. at 755. 
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F. THE IMPORTANCE OF SECURITIES LAW IN STAGE ONE 
Conceptualizing a “digital asset game” in two stages not only provides 
a convenient roadmap for determining the nature of the relationship between 
capital providers and developers but also fits well within several corporate 
law theories such as asset partitioning,256 entity shielding,257 and limited 
liability.258  Namely, a legal entity (i.e., a developer) promises to create and 
set aside future assets (viz., future tokens or coins) for the benefit of its 
creditors, while limited liability protects the firm-developer and its equity-
holders in case their efforts to design and deliver the assets are unsuccessful.   
Most importantly, the proposed framework emphasizes the centricity of 
securities law during Stage One.  During this first stage, there is an 
identifiable firm seeking capital, developing the tokens and underlying 
platform, and performing contractual obligations under investment contracts.  
Securities law and the underlying theory of the firm, particularly new 
institutionalism and transaction cost economics, are familiar with the 
attendant risks, including information asymmetry, agency costs, 
opportunism, conflicts of interest, the collective action problem, and 
others.259   
As any other financial innovation, cryptoassets supply a new 
combination of concerns.  The two-stage framework is useful in identifying 
these entwined risks.  First, a firm-developer may anticipate that its offering 
is not a repeat, long-term game but rather a finite game with a very limited 
time horizon because the project is designed to be ultimately decentralized 
and autonomous (Stage Two) and/or because the issuer does not plan future 
offerings.260  In that case, the firm-developer’s long-term incentives might 
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not be aligned with those of the investors.261  Consequently, token delivery 
and platform deployment become the last period for the firm and its 
management where “constraints markets and norms generally exert over the 
self-serving biases of its directors and managers are likely to fail.”262 
A rational entrepreneur may realize that, since they would soon cease to 
be the central authority invested in a project’s long-term success, they would 
not bear the costs, whether reputational, economic, or legal, of its failure.  
Whereas larger and more established firms could still face reputational and 
legal ramifications of their actions,263 smaller issuers and firms located in 
foreign jurisdictions with more lenient securities enforcement regimes and 
less private litigation would represent greater risks.264   
Second, token developers, particularly firms with fewer resources, with 
less experienced teams or in early stages of development, may possess 
incomplete information when they seek funding on the promise to furnish 
operational assets.265  Yet, in keeping with behavioral economics, these 
developers may exhibit optimism bias and be overconfident in their 
projections.266  Experts, regulators, and private litigants have already 
demonstrated that many developers have overestimated their coding abilities, 
touted potential but ultimately unsuccessful functionalities, written codes 
vulnerable to errors and attacks, or overstated their ability to address market 
risks through decentralized and autonomous governance systems.267   
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Another germane wrinkle is the replicable nature of the technology.  
Issuers publish not only descriptive whitepapers full of soft information and 
forward-looking statements but also their source code.268  The code is 
examined by the crypto-community and industry participants.269  It is 
possible that as proprietary information is disclosed and examined, the firm’s 
competitive advantages are eroded.270   
Entwining these factors with the inevitability of Stage Two and the last 
period problem is bound to affect the strategic thinking of an average issuer.  
Issuer-investor conflicts are typical.  While every salesman “has an obvious 
incentive to supply the market with information indicating that the product is 
worth its asking price,”271 and even if many crypto-firms are honest issuers, 
all salesmen also “stand to benefit by leading the recipient to overvalue the 
product.”272  If an asset’s quality is opaque, and the asset is truly novel,273 as 
cryptoassets are, issuers have more room to exaggerate and misrepresent the 
value of their assets.274  The last period problem and the ex ante expectation 
that an autonomous and decentralized Stage Two is unavoidable only 
exacerbate these risks.   
As a result, securities law has a crucial role to play in digital asset 
markets during Stage One.  In enacting the federal securities statutes, 
Congress highlighted that issuers could be affected by conflicts of interest 
and have informational advantages vis-à-vis investors.275  Congress mandated 
disclosure as prescribed by the SEC and enacted extended liability provisions 
for material misstatements and omissions in public offering documents such 
as registration statements and prospectuses.276  Issuers and experts retained 
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by them carefully draft public offering documents to avoid liability. Investors 
may bring actions, often class actions, under the antifraud provisions of the 
Securities Exchange Act, as well as for violations of the Securities Act after 
they have purchased the issued securities.277     
Recall that if tokens and coins distributed in crowdfunding events do 
not give an equity stake to purchasers, they can be analogized with bonds.  
Bonds are contracts.  Bondholders are not owed fiduciary duties and cannot 
file lawsuits under state law for breach of fiduciary duties, nor do they 
participate in corporate governance.278  They may protect themselves through 
trustees and contractual terms; indentures purporting to protect the value of 
the bonds typically include covenants curbing opportunistic managerial 
behavior.   
The effectiveness of these mechanisms, however, is debatable even in 
the traditional bond markets let alone “quasi-bond” cryptoasset markets.279  
It is of the utmost importance that bondholders, as security-holders, enjoy a 
private right of action under securities law280 and may rely on SEC oversight 
and enforcement.  Determining to which investors and issuers securities law 
applies, as well as the relevant timing of its application, becomes a pressing 
concern for the evolution of safe and efficient digital asset markets.  
G. CONCLUSION 
This Article propounds a novel approach to the threshold questions on 
the applicability of securities law to digital assets.  The clarity of this 
framework should be useful to courts, regulators, and market participants.  
The two-stage offering approach amalgamates a contractual view of debt 
securities with the traditional securities law analysis (viz., Howey and its 
progeny).  It centers the analysis on the contractual expectations of the 
investors and the obligations of the issuer.  This conveniently demonstrable 
analytical roadmap should assist courts and the crypto-community in 
categorizing technologically complex digital assets.  I hope that the two-stage 
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template presented in this Article will reduce the regulatory uncertainty and 
provide much needed clarity to the market, regulators, and factfinders. 
